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5 Summary and conclusions 
Current concern over the competitiveness of Community industry arises from a widely-
held but vague general feeling that the Community is in danger of 'losing the race'. Several 
factors have combined to bring about this unease: 
(i) 
(ii) 
the decline of  a number of traditional industries which, in the past, provided the main-
stay of  economic prosperity. This decline is by no means exclusive to Europe but some 
of Europe's competitors, especially Japan, seem to have adjusted better; 
the changing structure of world trade. The emergence of newly industrializing and 
certain developing countries as direct competitors for a wide range of markets has in-
tensified the pressure for change but the enduring nature of the recession has ham-
pered the necessary switch into alternative areas. The importance of trade to the 
economy of the Community makes it imperative that a competitive solution be found; 
(iii)  the recognition of the importance of the new technologies to 'post-industrial' society 
and the awareness that other countries, such as the USA and Japan, are further ad-
vanced than the Community in the commercial application and development of these 
technologies. 
The purpose of this report is to carry out a preliminary appraisal of the performance of 
Community industry, on the basis of the main indicators, vis-a-vis two of its principal in-
dustrialized trading partners, the USA and Japan. Obviously, because the issue is such a 
complex one, it is not possible to give a simple or conclusive answer to the question 'How 
competitive is Community industry?'. The answer will vary from sub-sector to sub-sector 
and between the Member States. Neither is it possible to make direct comparisons between 
the Community, composed of ten Member States of very different size, levels of develop-
ment and industrial infrastructures on the one hand with the size and internal coherence of 
the USA and Japan on the other. Despite these very real limitations certain trends can be 
discerned which have a bearing on competitiveness. The message which emerges most of-
ten is that, in the face of the challenges posed during the 1970s, the Community has not 
fared so badly to date but that unless remedial action is  taken now future performance 
could be impaired. 
Trends in international trade 
The Community is the world's largest trading area. Extra-Community exports account for 
15.7 % of total world exports. The Community holds substantial shares of world export 
markets for a very wide range of products. Furthermore, total trade between the Member 
States is even larger than the Community's international trade. 
7 In view of the more rapid development of industrial exports taking place in other areas of 
the world, it is not surprising that some of these export market shares are coming under 
pressure. If  one were to take account of the development of local industry in Third World 
markets, the decline in our share of  total markets would probably prove to be even greater. 
If  the Community was participating in the development of  the world economy in a balanced 
and beneficial manner it would be quite normal to relinquish shares of  markets in which our 
comparative advantage or competitiveness was declining, and to make compensating gains 
in other markets. 
But in practice we are concerned that this is not taking place sufficiently and that the Com-
munity is not doing well enough in those products where we ought to have a comparative 
advantage to make up for the products where we are doing less well, and in some cases 
quite badly. Only the Community's agro-industries, raw materials and energy products 
have done well in world markets. 
The Community is  not alone in this respect: there are some indications that the United 
States is experiencing similar problems with its manufacturing exports. However, the USA 
is less dependent than is the Community on manufacturing exports, and holds a very strong 
position for agricultural products and unworked metals. 
Consequently, the overriding concern is that the Community as a whole remains heavily 
committed to exporting a wide range of medium-technology industrial products where our 
competitiveness is threatened both on price and on innovation. These threats impinge first 
in those Member States and industries where the structure is weakest, and the resulting de-
cline in output, employment and exports is clearly already taking place in several parts of 
the Community. 
Since the Community already holds substantial market shares in so many areas, and our 
products do not seem to be outstandingly competitive, there are limits to the extent to 
which we can solve our problems of low growth and high unemployment simply by further 
increasing market shares: our firms are as likely to be competing with each other in third 
markets as with Japanese or American firms. Community industry consequently has a ma-
jor interest in a recovery in the overall rate of growth of world demand which would carry 
the absolute level of Community exports up with it, without necessarily having to increase 
market shares.l  · 
Meanwhile, there are certain high technology, high skill product areas where Community 
industry has no business to be turning in such mediocre results. Here we have much to learn 
from the Japanese, both regarding corporate strategy and regarding public policy. 
Industrial specialization 
When we compare the degree of specialization of Community exports with those of the 
USA and Japan, we  find  first  that both the United States and Japan are much  more 
specialized in certain products. This in turn tends to reflect the outstanding international 
1  'The European Community problems and prospects', Cambridge Economic Policy Review, December 1981. 
8 success of  a few major corporations.1 By contrast, the overall structure of the Community's 
exports is rather close to the average structure of total OECD exports, which is not surpris-
ing given the weight of Community exports in international trade, and is consistent with the 
broad conclusion reached above regarding export market shares. 
Not only are Community exports relatively unspecialized, the degree of specialization in 
high technology, high skill products seems to be declining and certain Member States' ex-
ports are even specializing in product areas where they are - or will be-competing mainly 
with newly industrializing countries, rather than with other developed countries. This is a 
disturbing prospect as it raises the whole question of productivity and price competitive-
ness at the relatively high level of wages (by world standards) which prevail throughout the 
Community. 
It  is not very clear what can be done about this in the short term particularly as the level of 
industrial investment is so low, but this prospect, and the inherent dangers, should concen-
trate the minds of corporate planners and industrial policymakers in the Community. 
Costs, prices and exchange rates 
The results of our analysis of the inter-relationships between wages, productivity, prices 
and exchange rates as they affect competitivity are not unambiguous. Thus we may con-
clude tentatively: 
(i)  that countries which have been less successful at controlling their wage costs have also 
had more balance-of-payments problems; 
(ii)  although hourly productivity trends are not inversely proportional to changes in unit 
wage costs, rapid increases in productivity help to moderate the effects of increased 
wage costs; 
(iii)  in general the fall in the rate of  growth of productivity  2 does not explain competitive-
ness problems during the 1970s; 
(iv)  the foreign trade performance of different sectors is sensitive to increased wage costs 
to very different degrees: there seems to be a direct link in textiles, leather goods and 
clothing industries; but no identifiable link at all for the capital goods industries; 
(v)  since 1970, exchange rate fluctuations appear to have been greater than changes in 
unit wage costs. Their effects on competitiveness is difficult to assess because of the 
divergence between nominal and real exchange rates. 
Price competitiveness is only a part of overall competitiveness and improvements in this 
sphere will be neither beneficial nor durable if other factors are leaning in the opposite di-
rection. In particular, if a budget deficit cannot be readily financed domestically, then are-
duction in the 'real' rate of  exchange will not lead to an improvement in international trade. 
Rather, inflation will accelerate and trigger further damaging falls in the exchange rate, in-
1  For example, Boeing, IBM, Sony, Toyota. 
2  The decline in the rate of  growth of  productivity is much more striking in the USA than in most of the Commun-
ity. 
9 creases in the external deficit and inflation such that the 'vicious circle' will only be broken 
by even more severe action on the budgetary and monetary side than would otherwise have 
been necessary. 
Industrial structure 
The evidence about industrial structure and investment draws attention to the fact that in-
dustrial structure has been adjusting slowly to the new economic situation. A few sectors 
such as chemicals and transport equipment have increased in relative importance whereas 
textiles, leather and clothing have declined quite rapidly and food, beverages and tobacco 
have declined more slowly. On the other hand, value added in comparatively advanced sec-
tors such as industrial machines, office machines and electrical goods have grown rather 
slowly. 
The trends in industrial investment suggest that the adjustment which is taking place is at 
least in the right direction; within the limits of a very modest level of investment in manu-
facturing industry the rate of investment appears to have been growing most rapidly (in 
most of  the Member States) in those sectors where the level of technology and skills suggest 
that the Community ought in future to be able to maintain its comparative advantage. 
By comparison with our competitors, the available evidence suggests a very rapid growth in 
the Japanese capital stock in the past decade, bringing it up to the levels of  the USA and the 
Community. By contrast, capital employed per employee in the USA and the Community 
appears to have more or less stagnated since the mid-1970s. In 1979, for example, invest-
ment in manufacturing as a percentage of GDP was almost twice as high in Japan as in the 
Community and the USA. 
In the Community and the USA there is an immediate need for investment in productive 
facilities in a wide range of sectors in order to bring about modernization and rationaliz-
ation. The generalized shift in industrialized countries to the service sector will of itself re-
duce the overall importance of investment in manufacturing but will also require a major 
investment effort, particularly in new technologies. 
There are also considerable differences in manufacturing investment trends between the 
Member States. For example, the absolute level in France and Germany is about double 
that of Italy and the UK. 
Energy 
Concerning energy, it is important to recognize that the primary effect of the two dramatic 
increases in oil prices in 1973 and 1979 on industry has not been the increase in energy 
costs, but the deflationary effect of the un-recycled transfer to OPEC. Consequently, the 
primary reason for reducing energy consumption is not to reduce costs,per  se, but to reduce 
the Community's vulnerability to further levies of  this kind, the potential cost of  which hav-
ing now been so conclusively demonstrated. 
10 For practical reasons it will be necessary to use the price mechanism and energy taxes to 
hasten the adjustment to a much lower level of energy consumption, and in the short term 
this will result in a competitive disadvantage to parts of industry. 
Corporate structure and performance 
The first response to any challenge to European competitiveness must come from the indi-
vidual companies in the different sectors. The evidence available on corporate perfor-
mance suggests that on average Community industry has not performed as well as its US 
and Japanese competitors during the 1970s. Part of the weakness lies in the relative inabil-
ity of European industry to generate an operating surplus which can keep up with the rising 
cost of capital, with consequent adverse impact on its investment propensity and sectoral 
and geographic shifts of resources. This vicious circle is undermining the competitive posi-
tion of EC industry and its capacity to adjust endogenously to present and foreseeable chal-
lenges. 
Analysis of company accounts reveals a weaker performance in terms of sales margins, re-
turn on assets and remuneration of equity capital by Community companies than by US, 
and to a lesser extent, Japanese companies. For example, in 1980, the first hundred indus-
trial groups in Europe realized an average net profit on sales of 1.4 % against 2.4 % of the 
first hundred Japanese groups and 4.8% of the first hundred US groups. The gap is also 
considerable in terms of net profit on own capital: 6.5% for European corporations, 14% 
for the Japanese, 15.6% for the Americans. 
Company financial structures also vary: on average Community companies rely more on 
own funds than Japanese companies but less than US ones. However, US companies can 
rely on a stronger financial base and Japanese companies enjoy the positive effects of 
long-standing financial discipline and are favoured by the lending policies of Japanese fi-
nancial institutions. 
However, higher levels of investment expenditure would not of themselves solve current 
problems. The role of management is crucial. Experience has shown that important gains in 
productivity  and  production  costs,  financial  results  and  market  penetration  can  be 
achieved through good organization and management. Professional salaried management 
has developed more slowly in the Community than in the USA. From a number of studies 
the greater preference of the average American and Japanese manager for risk-taking 
emerges together with considerable concern for product quality-two basic qualities which 
contribute to coping efficiently with current competition. Thus historical delays and certain 
national characteristics may have had a negative effect on industrial efficiency in the Com-
munity and hindered the implementation of the appropriate strategies. 
Industrial efficiency and competitiveness rely to a considerable extent on the internal man-
agement and planning of all aspects of the enterprise. There would appear to be room for 
improvement in this respect in many European Community companies. Responsibility for 
this improvement lies not only with company management and employees but also with the 
financial institutions and the public authorities. That corporate strategies play a crucial role 
in shaping structural change is further demonstrated by the high proportion of interna-
tional trade which takes the form of inter-firm transactions. 
11 However, the burden of these costs should not be exaggerated. On the one hand, it is quite 
possible to adjust to a less energy-intensive economy, without sacrificing growth by making 
best use of available technology.! On the other hand Japan, which has an even worse 
energy and raw material situation, has been able to adjust rapidly in this direction following 
each oil price rise. 
Human capital 
The changing nature of employment in recent decades has increased the importance of 
human capital endowments as a determinant of economic growth and international com-
petitiveness. In many respects the Community, the USA and Japan have similar human 
capital endowments-educated work forces, rising levels of  female participation, low levels 
of  population growth, broadly similar employment structures etc. but one must look to var-
iations in emphasis for clues as to the positive or negative contributions to competitiveness 
which the different populations represent. 
At the moment the USA and EC have labour forces of roughly comparable size and about 
double that of Japan. In view of the increasing technical sophistication of the production 
system and the spread of new technologies to all parts of the economic system there is a 
growing need for these labour forces to have a high level of basic education and some form 
of post-school training. Despite the fact that the evidence is incomplete it appears that the 
Community could be at a relative disadvantage vis-a-vis  the USA and Japan in terms of 
availability of technically skilled workers. For example, there are indications of lower 
levels of scientists and engineers in the Community labour force than in either the USA or 
Japan and in a number of Member States the proportion of students following science and 
engineering courses has fallen during the last decade. In addition the level of vocational 
education in the Community appears lower than that of the USA and is more heavily con-
centrated on young people. The fact that around 40% of young school-leavers pursue no 
further training or education is particularly worrying. In Japan there appears to be consid-
erable emphasis on engineering skills,  which  is  to be expected from the emphasis on 
streamlined production systems. Most vocational education is on the job, which tends to 
make it very specific. 
Among the most commonly cited indicators of international labour competitiveness are 
wage costs and productivity. The evolution of  unit wage costs 1970-80 (in national curren-
cies) for the manufacturing sector shows similar trends for the USA (6.2 %) and Japan 
(6.6 %) and wide variations in Member State performance (from 5.5% in Germany to 
15.5% for Italy and the UK). 
Trends in hourly productivity rates in volume terms for the same period show the highest 
increase for Japan (7.4 %), a relatively bad performance by the USA (2.4 %) and again 
widely different performances by Member States (2.7% in the UK and 7.4% in Belgium). 
In the period 1975-80 Japan increased its productivity growth even more to 7.9% while 
the USA fell to 1.9% and Belgium (the highest ranked EC country) decreased slightly to 
6.8 %. However, exchange rate changes also have an important bearing on international 
comparisons of this kind as can be seen from a comparison of wage costs in US dollars. 
t  Pour une croissance econome en en.ergie,  June 1979. 
12 In this context European corporations should verify whether their strategies live up to the 
challenge of their American and Japanese competitors, particularly as the process of inter-
nal adjustment within the firm is quicker and can benefit more readily from the necessary 
consensus than adjustment brought about by macroeconomic measures. 
Adjustment is certainly influenced by external factors which go beyond the direct control 
of the company but this in itself is not a justification for inaction, as the enterprise's main 
challenge lies in combining resources and constraints in view of economic results. Besides 
the invisible hand of the market and the visible hand of public policy, company organiz-
ation and strategies can play a transparent and fundamental role in regaining international 
competitiveness. 
* 
*  * 
This analysis of the competitiveness of Community industry is incomplete and inconclu-
sive. To some extent, this is in the nature of the case, for the reasons described in the intro-
duction. 
However, the work done for the preparation of this report during the past six months has 
clarified the need for a more systematic approach to the analysis of  industrial competitive-
ness within the Commission. 
13 I.  Introduction 
A.  Objectives of  the report 
This report about the competitiveness of Community industry has been prepared at there-
quest of the European Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. It  fol-
lows a series of reports published by the Commission about different aspects of domestic 
and international economic developments, structural change and adjustment. 1 
Since this report deals with industry, and in practice with manufacturing industry, an at-
tempt has been made to present the available information in a disaggregated way so as to 
show what is happening in the various branches of industry. This approach has one major 
drawback - the welter of statistics, particularly where we  present the information by 
Member State as well. We can but ask for the reader's understanding, for we have found no 
other solution. 
Each reader who is particularly familiar with one or other of the Member States is likely to 
find Community aggregates misleading simplifications; each industrial worker or manager 
will inevitably feel that the data for his 'sector' hide a multitude of strengths and weaknes-
ses in individual firms. In a very real sense we are discussing an unattainable concept: in so 
far as  the competitiveness of European industry is  the result of the competitive perfor-
mance of all the industrial enterprises in the Community it is not possible to describe it, let 
alone analyse it, in a single report. Thus, we are obliged to discuss the question in terms of 
approximate aggregates which are at best proxies for the real world. 
What we have set out to do therefore is to try and present a coherent survey of the evidence 
about competitiveness and the factors which affect it in the short and longer term. The in-
formation is not conclusive, and in some respects it is contradictory. The indications of are-
lative decline in the Community can be interpreted in different ways. Explanations for the 
decline in competitiveness are hardly ever equally valid for the same product or sector in 
each Member State, nor do the same considerations apply to international competitiveness 
as to competitiveness in the domestic Community market. 
B.  The meaning of  competitiveness 
There is no single measure of competitiveness. At best it is a composite concept, because 
different measures (price, export share, profitability, unit costs, etc.) give different results. 
1  See references in Annex 1. 
15 In this report we have endeavoured to present relevant information about the following 
principal quantifiable factors: 
(i)  export market shares; 
(ii)  specialization of industrial structure; 
(iii)  costs and exchange rates; 
(iv)  profitability and the financial structure of industry; 
(v)  industrial investment; 
(vi)  the structure of the industrial labour force. 
We recognize that there are many other considerations which cannot be treated quantita-
tively and that-for lack of space and information-these have had to be treated inciden-
tally in the report. 
A recent report of the European Management Forum  1  also tried to make international 
comparisons of competitiveness and used as many as 240 different criteria, many of which 
are unquantifiable. 
Even in areas which are ostensibly quantifiable, there are a number of major statistical dif-
ficulties which weaken the significance of specific conclusions. These problems are well 
known but the main ones are set out in Annex 4 so that all readers are forewarned. 
Finally, it must be stressed that 'competitiveness' is in any case a relative concept. There is 
no 'race from A to B' in economics, except in comparing individual firms. The question is a 
matter of relative positions in terms of resources and products and the change in relative 
positions over time. The indicators have to be interpreted with common sense: 
(i)  international economic development, especially industrialization of the NICs will 
lead to an apparent relative 'decline' of the presently developed areas in terms of  per-
centage shares; 
(ii)  a declining share in low value added activities may be a consequence of increased 
overall competitiveness. 
There are also normative considerations: 
(i)  underlying any evaluation of the relative position of European industry there is a his-
torical or political concept of what the position 'ought' to be; 
(ii)  different objectives (output, employment, profits, exports) lead to different assess-
ments. 
Competitiveness is also a dynamic concept; the relative position of companies and coun-
tries in the future is not only affected by the parameters determining present levels and 
trends, but also by changes in the paramenters themselves-investment, the training of the 
working people, technology and innovation, among others. 
1  Report on industrial competitiveness, 1981,  European Management Forum, Geneva, November 1981. 
16 II.  The evidence from trade 
This chapter of the report is essentially a review of the evidence from international trade, 
exchange rate data and an international comparison of wage costs as they are relevant to 
assessing the competitiveness of Community industry. 
In the first place we describe, briefly, the structure of international trade by the major 
groups of countries and principal product categories, including the structure of the Com-
munity's international and domestic trade by product and Member State. 
Secondly, we examine trends in the share of international trade  1 accounted for by Com-
munity exports of various products. 
Thirdly, the chapter refers to the information which the Commission has developed re-
cently concerning the trends in specialization and comparative advantage of  the Communi-
ty's trade and those of our principal international competitors. 
Finally, we examine the relationship between prices, costs and exchange rates as they affect 
industrial competitiveness. 
It  is important to bear in mind in the following discussion of the structure and trends of  in-
ternational trade that many factors are at work in addition to the operation of market 
prices. It is important to understand these factors before reaching conclusions from the 
data. For example, a substantial proportion of OECD exports benefit from official export 
credit, sometimes subsidized. Secondly, some trade flows arise from major investments in 
processing or manufacturing plant. Experience is that in such situations a major change in 
competitiveness is necessary before the plant is closed or moved and the trade flow is inter-
rupted. 
Related to the previous point is the fact that a very large share of international trade is in-
ternal transactions between branches or subsidiaries of the same firm. This has recently 
been estimated2  at 45 % of US exports, 30 % of Community exports3  and only 17 % of 
Japanese exports, and there are good reasons to expect that such exchanges will be to some 
extent cushioned from the short-term effects of market prices for products, factors and cur-
rencies. 
Furthermore, an ill-defined but possibly growing share of trade takes place under barter or 
buy-back deals which, almost by definition, are insensitive to market forces. 
1  On the basis of the exports or the imports of OECD countries only. 
2  Dunning, Pearce, The world's industrial enterprises,  Gower, 1981. 
3  Including intra-EC exports. 
17 A.  Changes in world trade 
1.  World trade 
The volume of world trade increased between 1963 and 1973 by an average of 8. 7 % per 
year whereas between 1973 and 1981 it increased by only 3.6% per year. During these 
periods  the  average  annual  growth  rate  in  world  output fell  from  5.7%  to  3.1% 
(1973-80). The world recession which began in 1973 has clearly resulted in dispropor-
tionate contraction in world trade. 
Table 1 shows that there was little variation in the geographical distribution of world trade 
between 1963 and 1973 except for the growth of Japanese exports. The industrialized 
countries increased their share of  imports and exports from 67% to 71% mainly at the ex-
pense of the State-trading countries. Developing countries' share of exports and imports 
declined slowly. 
18 
Total world trade (USD 1 000 million) 
Tota1
1 
1.  Industrial countrie; 
of which: 
'nlble'l 
Worlcltradeby .............. 
B:a:ports 
1963 l  1968  J 1973 l  1980 
ISS  238  574  1973 
% 
100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
67.3  70.3  70.8  63.5 
European Community (9 countries)  33.8  34.6  36.6  33.3 
(of which: intra-EEC trade)  (  15.2)  (  16.4)  (  19.3)  (  17.6) 
Rest of Europe  7.7  8.0  8.4  7.7 
USA  13.4  14.6  11.9  10.6 
Japan  3.4  5.3  6.4  6.6 
2.  Less-developed countries  20.6  18.4  19.2  27.5 
ofwhich, countries in: 
Africa  4.3  4.0  3.6  4.6 
America  7.3  S.8  S.1  S.4 
Asia  8.9  8.3  10.3  17.4 
Imports 
t963  1 t968  1 t973  1 t98o 
15S  238  574  1973 
% 
100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
66.9  69.5  71.0  67.3 
34.7  33.7  3S.7  34.6 
(  15.2)  (  16.4)  (  19.3)  (  17.6) 
10.6  10.S  11.2  10.2 
11.0  14.0  12.1  12.1 
3.7  4.5  6.0  6.2 
20.5  18.7  17.6  23.2 
4.0  3.S  3.1  4.1 
6.3  6.1  S.4  6.3 
9.8  8.9  8.9  12.6 
(oil-producing developing countries)  (  5.9)  (  5.8)  (  7.3)  (  15.0)  (  2.9)  (  3.1)  (  3.5)  (  6.5) 
3.  Countries with State trade  12.1  11.3  10.0  9.0  11.5  10.7  9.8  8.5 
of which: 
USSR  4.5  3.6  3.9  4.0  3.6  3.5 
4.  Unspecified  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.1  1.1  1.6  0.9 
Source: G A  TI  International Trade. 
1 Including intra-Community trade. 
2 Including Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. The most striking development since 1973 has undoubtedly been the large increase in ex-
ports by oil-producing developing countries of 7. 7 percentage points to 15 % as a result of 
the sharp rise in prices of petroleum. Meanwhile their imports rose by only 3 points and 
those of developing countries as a whole by 5.5 points to 23 %. Since the relative shares of 
State-trading countries have only declined slightly since 1973, the pattern in the indus-
trialized countries has been directly determined by the greater role played by the develop-
ing countries. In 1980, the industrialized countries' share of world exports was only 64% 
compared with 71% in 1973 but their share of world imports was 67%. The gap between 
their relative shares of exports and imports highlights the seriousness of the imbalances 
faced by the industrialized countries in the turbulent period since 1973. 
Table 2 shows the structure of world trade by the principal product groups. First, one must 
note that apart from the very rapid growth in the importance of energy products between 
1973 and 1980, the overall structure of world trade has been rather stable. Previously, be-
tween 1963-73, trade in engineering products expanded more rapidly than total world 
trade, but this is  no longer the case. 
During 1963-73 the relative share of capital goods moved from 25% to 33 %. 
Table 2 
World trade by eommoditJ groaps 
Produci group  1963  1968  1973  1980 
Total world exports (USD 1 000 million)  154  I  239  I  574  I  1973 
,% 
Total exports  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
1. Primary products  42.2  35.4  37.7  43.3 
of  which: 
fuels  10.2  9.6  11.1  23.7 
food and beverages  19.5  15.7  15.0  11.2 
raw materials  12.5  10.1  11.6  8.4 
2. Mamifactured products  55.9  63.0  60.5  55.2 
of  which: 
iron and steel  4.8  4.8  5.0  3.9 
chemicals  6.1  7.1  7.3  7.7 
engineering products  25.1  29.1  32.7  30.0 
of  which: 
machinery for specialized industries  (  9.1)  (  8.0) 
office and telecommunications equipment  (  3.0)  (  3.0) 
road motor vehicles  4.7)  6.6)  (  7.1)  (  6.4) 
other machinery and transport equipment  (  10.8)  (  10.0) 
domestic equipment  (  2.6)  (  2.4) 
textiles and clothing  6.0  5.9  6.3  4.8 
other manufactured products  14.0  16.1  9.3  8.9 
3. Not allocated  1.8  1.6  1.8  1.5 
Source: G A  TI International Trade. 
Note: Base: exports, fob. 
Including intra-EEC trade. 
19 The increase in the price of petroleum and other raw materials since 197  3 has interrupted 
this trend. Between 1973 and 1980, the share of total exports of manufactured products 
from OECD countries showed only a slight rise with moderate increases in the share of  in-
termediate products-probably on account of higher price rises than for capital goods-but 
these have not been as high as  the increases for petroleum products. 
The main factor affecting the structure of world trade since 1973 has therefore been the 
doubling of the share accounted for by fuels, which increased from 11 % to 24 % of world 
exports in seven years. 
The European Community accounts for one-third of total world trade (1980), as reported 
by GATT. Rather less than half of Community trade is extra-Community trade. In 1980 
intra-Community  trade  was  251 000  million  ECU  and  extra-Community  trade  was 
221 000 million ECU. 
Although all Community trade is classified in international statistics as international trade, 
intra-EC trade and extra-EC trade are different in important respects, and should be 
treated separately. 
Tables 3 and 4 set out the size and structure of the Community's international trade in 
manufactured products. 
2.  Extra-Community trade 
The Community's trade with the rest of  the world is spread across many world markets, and 
includes a very wide range of products. However, most of these exports fall into a few 
industry classifications.  Of total extra-EC exports 68% is  accounted for by six  sectors 
(metals, chemicals, mechanical and electrical engineering, motor vehicles,  agro-industries). 
Table 3 gives the detailed structure of Community extra-EC manufactured exports by in-
dustry and Member State of origin in 1980. 
In addition to the principal exporting industries and Member States mentioned above, 
there are significant amounts of exports coming from the metals sector in Belgium, from 
the chemicals and agro-industries in the Netherlands, from metal manufacturers in Ger-
many and Italy, aircraft and railway equipment in France, textiles in Germany and from 
clothing and footwear industry in Italy. 
In relation to the size of their economies one may also draw attention to the importance of 
extra-EC exports of food products for Ireland and of food products and mechanical en-
gineering for Denmark. 
Thus, although the structure of the Community's international exports is constantly chang-
ing, this picture of the situation in 1980 at least gives an indication of the relative impor-
tance of world markets for Community industries. Clearly in the discussion which follows 
of competitive performance in different markets and sectors, a weak performance is of 
greater significance for income and employment in the Community the greater the amount 
20 Table 3 
Extra-Community exports of manufactured products by Member State in 1980, %  of EC 9 total 
NACE 
CLIO  Industry  EC9  B/L  DK  D  F  IRL  I  NL  UK 
code 
1 000 million ECU 
Total extra-EEC exports  221.1  112.9  16.1  171.6  139.2  11.5  128.7  114.0  147.1 
of  which: 
2-4  Manufacturing  193.6  10.5  5.2  67.4  35.0  1.3  26.1  10.6  37.5 
% 
2-4  Manufacturing  100.00  5.41  2.68  34.80  18.10  0.69  13.46  5.47  19.38 
21  Metalliferous ores  0.15  0.01  0.00  0.06  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.05  0.01 
22  Prel. process. of  metals  8.95  1.11  0.09  3.05  1.79  0.00  0.89  0.47  1.54 
23  Extr. of other minerals  1.13  0.01  0.00  0.05  0.03  0.01  0.08  0.04  0.92 
24  Non-metal. mineral prod.  2.20  0.08  0.05  0.58  0.42  0.02  0.64  0.04  0.37 
25  Chemical industry  12.27  0.79  0.25  4.46  2.28  0.12  1.17  1.12  2.08 
26  Man-made fibres industry  0.58  0.01  0.00  0.30  O.Q7  0.00  0.12  0.00  0.07 
31  Metal articles  4.88  0.15  0.12  1.70  0.87  0.01  1.06  0.17  0.81 
32  Mechanical engineering  19.08  0.56  0.49  7.98  2.76  O.o3  2.82  0.57  3.86 
33  Office & data proc. mach.  1.45  0.04  0.02  0.44  0.28  0.04  0.20  0.08  0.36 
34  Electrical engineering  9.83  0.32  0.29  3.92  1.83  0.05  1.09  0.53  1.80 
35  Motor vehicles & parts  10.76  0.29  0.04  5.48  2.05  0.00  1.09  0.11  1.70 
36  Other means of transport  3.18  0.11  O.Q7  0.48  0.95  0.01  0.37  0.42  0.77 
37  Instrument engineering  1.94  0.03  0.05  0.83  0.33  0.02  0.18  0.09  0.42 
41/42  Food. drink & tobacco  7.41  0.38  0.63  1.19  1.94  0.25  0.54  1.23  1.25 
43  Textile industry  3.56  0.27  0.12  1.09  0.51  0.02  0.71  0.19  0.63 
44  Leather & leather goods  0.43  0.01  0.01  0.10  0.08  0.00  0.17  0.01  0.06 
45  Footwear & clothing  2.32  0.04  0.09  0.54  0.40  0.02  0.86  0.04  0.31 
46  Timber & wooden furniture  1.20  0.03  0.12  0.39  0.15  0.00  0.37  0.02  0.12 
47  Paper & paper products  1.86  0.06  0.05  0.67  0.37  0.01  0.18  0.09  0.44 
48  Rubber & plastics  2.71  0.14  0.11  0.83  0.58  0.02  0.38  0.09  0.55 
49  Other manufacturing ind.  4.09  0.98  0.06  0.66  0.38  0.04  0.56  0.10  1.30 
Source: Eurostat. 
of exports which are thus exposed. At the same time, the implicit requirement for structural 
adjustment will be the larger. 
We shall see that to some extent the Community is  internationally competitive in those 
products which we export a lot of (which is not unexpected) but this is by no means the case 
in all important products and in each Member State. Steel and automobiles are evident 
examples. 
3.  Intra-Community trade 
Most international organizations1 treat intra-Community trade, that is the exports and im-
ports which take place between the Community Member States, as an integral part of in-
ternational trade. 
This is not satisfactory from the point of view of this report because in our assessment of in-
ternational competitiveness we are looking primarily at our performance vis-a-vis Japan 
1  UN, GATT, OECD. 
21 and the USA and it is rather misleading to dilute the international trade data with intra-
Community trade.1 
Furthermore, intra-Community trade is subject to economic influences very different to 
those affecting extra-Community trade. The complementarity and comparative advan-
tages between industries in different Member States are not the same as those which pre-
vail internationally. For all their imperfections, the domestic market policies established by 
the Treaties have had an effect. 
However, this distinction between intra and extra-Community trade does have limitations: 
the economies of the Member States are not yet so integrated that they can be treated as a 
single European economy, ~s one would treat the American or Japanese economies.2 
Intra-Community trade was in 1980 more important than extra-Community trade, for all 
products and for manufactured products. 
Intra-Community trade is understandably more important for the original Member States 
whose industries have had more time to adapt to the unified domestic market, and for the 
smaller Member States, particularly Belgium and the Netherlands. 
Table 4 presents the industrial composition of  intra-Community trade by country of origin 
in 1980. Compared with the structure of extra-Community trade, the following points 
emerge: 
· (i)  German and French industries' strengths in the Community market appear in the 
same sectors as in international trade, with the exception of 'other means of transport' 
for France; 
(ii)  the Community market is much more important than is the international market for 
the Italian textile, footwear and clothing industries; 
(iii)  the importance of  the Community market is increasing for British industry, and it is al-
ready more important than international sales in five sectors: footwear and clothing, 
office  and data-processing  machinery,  timber and wooden furniture,  man-made 
fibres and metalliferous ores; 
(iv)  there are several industries for which the Community market is much more important 
than extra-Community markets. These are food, drink and tobacco; textiles; rubber 
and plastics; footwear and clothing; paper and paper products; office and data-pro-
cessing machinery; timber and wooden furniture; metalliferous ores. As one might 
expect these include some products with relatively high transport costs, and some 
products for which the Community may be losing its international comparative advan-
tage and for which the common market provides some protection; 
(v)  comparing Member States' share of manufacturing industry's exports it is apparent 
that Belgium-Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Ireland have much larger exports to 
the Community market compared to their extra-Community exports. Whilst there 
may be strong historical and geographical reasons to explain this difference, it should 
be borne in mind that exports include warehouse exports, which tends to overstate to-
tal exports in countries which have large sea ports. 
1  Any more than international trade statistics contain the trade between, say, Florida and California, or between 
Hokkaido and Kyushu. 
2  Which are of  course also conventional simplifications given the significant regional disparities and differences in 
factor endowment and performance of different parts of the Japanese and American economies. 
22 Table4 
lntra-Coiii.DUIIIIty exports of ........... ~  by Member State In 1980,% ofEC 9 total 
NACE 
CLIO  Industry  EC9  B/L  DK  D  F  IRL  I  NL  UK 
code 
1  000 million ECU 
Total intra-EEC exports  250.6  133.2  16.1  166.6  140.8  14.5  126.7  138.0  ,34.7 
of  which: 
Manufacturing  203.0  27.5  5.0  60.0  34.3  4.2  24.0  23.9  23.9 
% 
2-4  Manufacturing  100.00  13.55  2.47  29.57  16.90  2.09  11.84  11.79  11.78 
21  Metalliferous ores  0.23  O.o3  0.00  0.03  0.04  0.03  0.00  O.o7  0.02 
22  Prel. process. of  metals  10.60  2.73  0.09  2.94  2.07  0.03  0.71  1.10  0.93 
23  Extr. of  other minerals  0.69  0.06  0.01  0.11  0.08  O.ol  0.03  0.08  0.31 
24  Non-metal. mineral prod.  2.59  0.41  0.04  0.67  0.40  0.03  0.60  0.22  0.21 
25  Chemical industry  12.95  1.74  0.11  3.57  2.39  0.24  0.67  2.60  1.63 
26  Man-made fibres industry  0.72  0.06  0.00  0.30  0.11  O.o3  0.11  0.02  0.08 
31  Metal articles  3.83  0.37  0.10  1.29  0.60  0.06  0.60  0.41  0.40 
32  Mechanical engineering  10.11  0.66  0.30  4.10  1.37  0.10  1.39  0.72  1.47 
33  Office & data proc. mach.  2.25  0.07  0.01  0.65  0.37  0.15  0.26  0.17  0.54 
34  Electrical engineering  7.78  0.77  0.17  2.92  1.24  0.14  0.95  0.59  1.00 
35  Motor vehicles & parts  11.72  1.98  0.05  4.46  2.62  0.05  1.04  0.45  1.07 
36  Other means of  transport  2.07  0.11  0.08  0.92  0.25  0.01  0.21  0.18  0.31 
37  Instrument engineering  1.63  O.o7  0.04  0.62  0.20  0.04  0.12  0.23  0.30 
41142  Food. drink & tobacco  11.21  1.26  1.05  2.00  1.84  0.71  0.56  2.76  1.01 
43  Textile industry  5.86  0.96  0.07  1.12  0.97  0.14  1.41  0.62  0.58 
44  Leather & leather goods  0.54  0.03  0.00  0.07  0.08  0.01  0.23  0.05  0.06 
45  Footwear & clothing  3.63  0.38  0.03  0.58  0.54  0.06  1.42  0.27  0.35 
46  Timber & wooden furniture  2.09  0.36  0.12  0.55  0.26  0.02  0.48  0.17  0.12 
47  Paper & paper products  3.09  0.44  0.05  0.93  0.52  0.03  0.31  0.50  0.31 
48  Rubber & plastics  3.74  0.48  O.o7  1.11  0.76  0.08  0.44  0.38  0.41 
49  Other manufacturing industry  2.65  0.57  0.05  0.61  0.17  0.09  0.29  0.20  0.66 
Source: Eurostat. 
B.  International market shares 
This part of the report examines the export performance of Community industry vis-a-vis 
its major international competitors. 
The approach adopted has been to examine the trends in the Community's share in inter-
national trade for the products of the sectors from two points of view: 
(i)  the Community's share of OECD exports of manufactures to the world (this should 
indicate how Community exports are performing against those of other developed 
countries, in particular the USA and Japan); 
(ii)  the Community's share as a supplier of exports of OECD imports of manufactures 
from the world (this should indicate how the Community is performing against both 
developed and developing countries on the OECD market which in 1980 accounted 
for 62 %1 of world imports). 
1  Including intra-Community trade. 
23 Any analysis of changes in market shares based on trade data alone suffers from a major 
shortcoming, that is that it can take no account of changes in trade which arise from the de-
velopment of local production in other countries. To do so, however, would require de-
tailed and up-to-date production and consumption data country by country on a worldwide 
basis, so as to base the analysis on each country's share of the total market for a product 
group, and not just that part of the market which manifests itself through the international 
trade statistics. Nor can the competitiveness of European industry in the domestic Com-
munity market be assessed on the basis  of cross-border transactions alone.  The total 
domestic market, including national production and consumption, should be taken into ac-
count. However, the statistical base to do this in a comparative and up-to-date way is still 
substantially lacking. 
This problem is partially resolved in the developing country and OPEC data shown in Ta-
bles 6 and 7 for market shares for relatively sophisticated industrial products in areas 
where local production is  still quite low. 
Thus, OECD exports of, for example, TV, radio and hi-fi equipment to Africa represent 
virtually the total market, and a declining Community share is a direct and unambiguous 
indication of declining competitiveness. 
1.  Shares of OECD exports to the world
1 
An analysis of OECD export shares provides a measure of  whether a country has been able 
to maintain or improve its relative share of the industrialized world's exports or whether, 
on the contrary, its share has fallen. 
Table 5 shows the changes in the share the Community, the USA and Japan hold in total 
exports from OECD countries to the world in 25 product groups. 
A look at the shares for 1980 over the whole range of products (agricultural and manufac-
tured products, energy and other raw materials) shows that the Community is  without 
doubt the largest exporter in the OECD since its extra-Community exports amount to 
nearly 37% of the OECD total, the United States taking only 25% and Japan 15 %. 
Moreover, although Japan has increased its relative share by 2.3 points since 1973, the 
Community has also fared well by increasing its own, already very high, level by 1.8 points 
while the United States' share has remained virtually unchanged. 
Taking manufactured products alone, Japan's position appears to be relatively strong 
(19.0%) even though the United States (22.3%) and the Community (38.6%) continue to 
predominate. Although at first sight this performance may seem encouraging, there are 
grounds for concern if one looks at the gains and losses in shares: while Japan has increased 
its own share by 2.6 points since 1973 and the United States its share by 0.8 points, the 
EEC has seen its share cut by 0.4 points. 
Increased competition in world trade since 1973-generated in part by the emergence of 
new competitors-could however be expected to affect first those countries which initially 
1  Not including intra-Community trade. 
24 Table 5 
Changes in shares of OECD exports 
OECD  Shares ofOECD exports' 
exports'  in 1980 
in 1980  % 
USD 1  000 million  Japan  I  USA  I EEC
1 
Total products  852  15.3  25.1  37.2 
Food, beverages, tobacco  75  2.3  42.8  33.3 
Agricultural products  27  0.7  55.8  9.4 
Mineral fuels  41  1.2  19.4  47.5 
Metals unworked  18  4.1  33.1  13.1 
Other raw materials  22  1.0  16.3  40.0 
Manufactured products  668  19.0  22.3  38.6 
of  which: 
Non-met. min. products  31  13.0  18.2  44.4 
Iron and steel  46  34.2  7.5  38.0 
Metal products  22  15.7  16.1  44.5 
Basic chemicals  45  9.0  28.8  44.4 
Chemical products  24  4.8  25.1  47.5 
Agricultural machinery  9  10.3  34.8  39.7 
Electrical machinery  40  22.3  23.0  40.1 
Power gen. machinery  20  17.1  27.5  40.9 
Other machinery  90  13.3  23.9  45.4 
Office and telecom. equipment  42  34.6  27.2  25.7 
Optical, clock, photo  31  24.4  26.6  30.8 
Road vehicles  89  32.5  16.4  32.7 
Other transport equipment  37  14.6  43.2  33.8 
Textiles  24  22.0  15.2  39.9 
Clothing  9  3.7  12.1  48.1 
Leather, shoes  8  4.9  9.7  51.3 
Paper  32  3.5  19.0  16.3 
Wood furniture  9  3.3  12.7  41.3 
Plastic, rubber  31  15.1  20.7  47.5 
Other manufactured products  30  14.7  29.4  45.1 
Source: Calculations by Commission staff on the basis of OECD trade data. 
1 Not including intra-Community trade. 
Changes 1973-80 
percentage points difference 
Japan  I  USA  I EEC
1 
2.25  0.09  1.82 
-0.6  -1.1  7.6 
-0.1  6.5  -0.8 
0.3  -1.4  11.2 
2.5  13.1  2.6 
-0.5  0.9  5.7 
2.6  0.8  -0.4 
0.9  2.9  -2.1 
2.2  -0.4  -3.6 
-0.0  -0.9  2.8 
-0.9  3.3  -1.8 
0.5  2.2  -1.2 
3.4  -2.7  -0.5 
7.7  -3.8  -2.0 
3.8  -0.1  4.4 
4.2  0.2  -4.0 
2.1  2.6  -1.4 
7.5  0.2  -3.6 
14.8  -5.0  -4.7 
-9.5  11.8  9.0 
-1.2  4.2  -3.2 
-7.0  4.5  3.7 
-1.8  3.3  -0.0 
0.5  2.9  0.9 
-2.8  -1.3  11.8 
-0.9  -0.4  0.2 
-1.4  -3.8  6.1 
held the largest shares. Taking manufactured products as a whole, the Japanese advance 
does not appear to have been made primarily at the expense of the Community or the 
United States. Japan is also subject to greater incentives to export manufactured products 
successfully since it exports neither raw materials nor agro-industrial products. 
The United States' predominant position cannot be challenged in agricultural products and 
unworked metals; they have substantially increased their already large share of these mar-
kets since 1973. In the face of such competition, the Community has to play a secondary 
role,  except perhaps for the food industries.  On the other hand, there is  virtually no 
Japanese presence in this product cat.egory. 
Since 1973, the US share of OECD exports of agricultural products increased from 49% to 
56%, compared with the Community's modest 9.4% and Japan's 0. 7%-both declining. 
25 By contrast, the Community predominates for the whole range of industrial intermediate 
products. Its share of each ofthese products is significantly larger than its two competitors'. 
There is little indication at present that this strong position is threatened in spite of the con-
siderable losses it has sustained in the steel sector. The American shares tend to be about 
half of the Community shares except in chemicals where the difference is less marked, but 
still significant. 
Japan's share is strong in the steel sector, and, if the present trend continues, it will soon be 
larger than the Community's share. Japan's share of exports of metal products is approxi-
mately the same as the United States', both far smaller than the Community's share, whilst 
Japan's share of chemicals and non-metallic mineral products exports does not bear com-
parison with the Community's or the United States'. 
In the capital goods sector, the shares appear more evenly distributed. 
Taking all machinery exports together, including electrical machinery, the Community is 
well ahead of its two competitors with shares greater than 40 %; this lead is particularly 
marked for industrial machinery. Although the US share for agricultural machinery has 
reached 35% (a small sector), its share for capital goods, as a whole, places it firmly in sec-
ond place although still far behind the Community. Japan takes the third place for these 
products with shares of between 10% and 22%. Since 1973, however, these shares have 
been increasing, moving up 7. 7 percentage points for electrical machinery while the Com-
munity and US shares have fallen. 
The  Community holds  25.7 %  of OECD exports  for  office  and telecommunications 
equipment, but this share is falling. Here the United States and especially Japan are the 
market leaders, accounting for 27.2 %and 34.6 %respectively of OECD exports, the USA 
having gained ground since 1973 over Japan with a faster rate of increase. As regards the 
precision engineering industries, the three competitors are all similarly placed. Although 
the Community is currently in the lead it is obvious that if the trends between 1973 and 
1980 continue ( + 7.5 points for Japan, -3.6 points for the EEC, no change for the USA), 
this advantage will soon disappear. 
The outstanding Japanese performance in the world trade in motor vehicles has caused the 
greatest upheaval since 1973. Japan has now caught up with the Community as the world's 
biggest exporter of motor vehicles. It has almost doubled its share of OECD exports in 
seven years, pushing it up to almost 33% in 1980 largely at the expense of the Community 
and the United States which lost 4. 7 and 5.0 percentage points respectively of OECD ex-
ports. 
As far as other transport equipmentl is concerned, however, the United States has re-
mained unchallenged. Not only do the United States hold the largest share (  43 %) but they 
have also recorded considerable gains since 1973 ( + 11.8 points). The Community is in 
second place with 33.8% of total OECD exports in 1980, an increase of9.0% since 1973. 
Japan, however, is not only some way behind (14.6%) but has also suffered substantial 
losses since 1973 (-9.5 points). 
1  This is a hybrid category. The overall movements are probably influenced primarily by the aircraft industry, but 
the data include shipbuilding and railway rolling stock. 
26 The Community holds a relatively strong position in OECD exports for consumer goods. 
Japan has only a small share with the exception of textiles and rubber and plastic products. 
However, since the data only cpver OECD exports, in those sectors where developing 
country exports  are  already significant,  particularly consumer goods  such  as  textiles, 
leather and footwear, the export shares only reflect the relative positions of the developed 
countries with each other in that part of the market which they supply. 
In short, were it not for the good performance of the agro-industry and raw materials ex-
ports, the overall performance of the Community's exports would have been much worse. 
For manufactured products as a whole, the Community lost ground relative to Japanese 
and United States exports. 
Given that the product categories shown in Table 5 are rather aggregated, and the data do 
not show in which world markets the Community's share was changing, we have analysed 
the developments for a number of products in the principal world markets. 
Community exports of 27 products or product groups were compared to total OECD ex-
ports of the same products. In both cases intra-Community exports were removed from 
total exports. The Community's share of OECD exports was examined over the period 
Table6 
Community exports to specified markets - Produets wlaere the~  dW ••  or held its on 
OECD  EEC  Exports as a percentage ofOECD exports to: 
Product group  Year  ex- ex-
USA  Japan  EFTA  Developin& countries of  ports  ports 
to world  to world  America  Africa  Asia 
USD  %of 
mio  OECD 
I  I 
1968  5 255  31.0  25.9  40.4  76.4  26.8  83.6  51.1 
Motor vehicle  1973  12052  33.1  23.7  33.0  74.7  32.4  83.8  54.4 
bodies, engines  1975  17 271  35.9  25.4  35.4  70.7  29.5  82.7  53.8 
and parts  1979  31690  35.5  33.0  36.8  76.4  24.3  82.5  44.0 
1980  34504  38.7  35.6  32.2  75.3  25.4  82.8  46.9 
1968  3 285  17.6  37.2  5.1  17.0  22.9  46.8  41.6 
1973  5 692  17.7  43.4  3.7  29.6  28.6  29.6  33.0 
Aircraft  1975  8122  19.2  55.5  6.5  18.1  16.2  55.2  28.0 
1979  15 291  29.5  50.1  5.7  19.8  28.5  62.9  25.1 
1980  21105  32.5  49.2  7.9  39.9  11.3  57.2  23.3 
1968  2479  42.1  22.2  17.4  69.0  32.6  76.5  46.9 
Telecommunications  1973  5 790  42.4  19.7  21.4  68.4  34.3  76.0  48.0 
1975  9 279  43.7  14.8  22.0  64.8  30.5  72.3  50.4  equipment  1979  17 720  42.0  18.2  29.1  67.7  32.1  71.6  48.9 
1980  20048  43.6  21.0  27.2  68.8  34.3  79.2  53.1 
1968  2492  41.2  58.9  41.3  78.6  37.7  69.5  40.3 
Organic  1973  5 178  43.2  58.4  40.0  78.0  39.5  74.3  39.4 
1975  8 481  42.5  61.2  43.9  77.6  34.7  71.6  30.6  chemicals  1979  17 817  44.4  55.7  36.5  84.8  34.5  74.8  36.5 
1980  19 325  43.3  54.9  30.3  84.3  32.8  72.4  36.1 
1968  1 873  46.0  59.4  25.3  77.0  41.2  85.5  35.2 
Plastic materials,  1973  4 677  50.7  58.2  38.6  79.7  44.1  86.7  33.7 
regenerated cellulose,  1975  6185  50.7  56.8  29.2  78.2  38.8  88.1  33.7 
resins  1979  14187  49.2  58.7  29.4  79.3  35.2  83.0  37.3 
1980  16453  48.1  57.0  27.8  78.0  29.3  81.5  37.7 
Source: United Nations and Commission departments. 
Note: Products: SITC rev.1: 7115+7326+7327+7328; 734; 7222+72491 +72499; 512; 581. 
OECD: not including Yugoslavia; Turkey (1980 only). 
OPEC: not including Gabon. 
1 Not including intra-EEC trade. 
OPEC 
56.7 
63.4 
64.5 
50.7 
57.1 
41.0 
53.7 
34.5 
37.4 
32.5 
58.0 
59.7 
58.5 
59.3 
65.4 
50.0 
54.5 
49.4 
47.0 
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55.5 
57.4 
53.2 
56.3 
55.4 
27 1968 to 1980 both in total and in selected major geographical zones. In value terms, these 
27 products accounted for 35% of total extra-Community exports. 
The principal results of this analysis appear in Tables 6 and 7. The five products or product 
groups which accounted for a significant part of OECD exports and for which the Com-
munity increased or maintained its share of OECD exports are shown in Table 6. The five 
for which the Community suffered its greatest losses in its share of OECD exports are 
shown in Table 7. 
Table 7 
Community exports to specified markets - Products where the Community did badly 
OECD  EEC  EEC exports as a percentage ofOECD exports to: 
Product group  Year  ex- ex-
USA  Japan  ports  ports 
to world  to world 
USD  %of 
mio  OECD 
I  I 
1968  6591  44.1  42.3  18.7 
1973  16652  41.2  42.5  17.4 
Iron and steel  1975  30016  41.1  31.9  19.2 
1979  42838  39.0  33.2  16.0 
1980  45702  36.4  27.8  15.6 
1968  5697  48.0  45.1  52.7 
1973  13583  .42.8  .39.4  50.9 
Passenger motor cars  1975  17571  37.9  32.6  51.1 
1979  35266  34.1  26.9  66.4 
1980  39697  31.1  25.0  78.7 
1968  1763  22.4  8.0  21.2 
TV, radio, hi-fi  1973  4818  17.7  7.3  36.9 
1975  5622  22.1  8.3  27.6  equipment  1979  11002  17.2  7.8  24.8 
1980  14332  13.4  5.8  21.8 
1968  1154  56.3  64.4  47.2 
Machine tools  1973  2392  54.5  52.4  39.7 
1975  3881  56.7  52.6  46.0  for working metals  1979  6445  47.5  37.4  48.8 
1980  7460  48.0  38.1  45.1 
Thermionic valves and  1968  654  40.6  38.4  3.7 
tubes, transistors,  1973  2271  31.4  32.4  9.4 
1975  2891  31.4  37.9  12.2  electronic  1979  5305  29.6  32.0  19.5  micro-circuits  1980  6679  27.2  29.0  23.6 
Source: Umted Nattons and Commission departments. 
Note: Products: SITC rev.!: 67; 7321; 7241+7242+72492+8911; 7151; 7293. 
OECD: not including Yugoslavia; Turkey (1980 only). 
OPEC: not including Gabon. 
1 Not including intra-EEC trade. 
EFfA  Developing countries of 
America  Africa  Asia 
76.7  41.5  73.6  39.2 
71.9  28.1  69.8  25.7 
67.7  34.5  64.8  24.6 
71.7  30.6  64.6  29.2 
70.7  27.9  61.6  25.7 
90.0  33.7  88.9  55.5 
81.9  38.6  85.0  53.2 
80.9  28.7  78.4  46.1 
81.3  39.4  79.2  29.0 
76.3  33.8  76.6  24.9 
58.1  11.6  44.6  22.9 
53.6  6.0  37.2  11.4 
48.2  6.3  30.1  10.9 
54.7  5.3  22.4  12.4 
49.1  6.6  22.1  7.8 
83.7  57.7  85.8  53.3 
82.4  50.4  88.0  48.2 
76.7  57.4  81.9  60.7 
76.0  45.8  80.2  42.4 
73.4  52.9  82.5  43.8 
48.1  8.3  82.1  15.4 
62.2  11.6  74.2  9.2 
67.0  7.3  63.8  8.5 
64.5  10.6  79.8  16.8 
59.4  10.5  72.1  17.0 
2.  Shares taken by major suppliers of OECD imports from the world 
OPEC 
61.2 
44.2 
35.2 
41.1 
39.8 
45.2 
51.8 
45.3 
32.9 
35.7 
22.5 
18.3 
13.0 
12.2 
9.0 
72.5 
71.6 
74.1 
55.5 
63.8 
36.0 
41.4 
44.2 
54.5 
47.6 
The OECD countries accounted for approximately 62% of  world imports of manufactured 
products in 1980. Taken as a whole they form a highly competitive market. The trends in 
the shares taken by the major sources of supply (i.e. exporters) of OECD imports 1 from 
1  Excluding intra-Community trade; not including New Zealand, Yugoslavia and Turkey. 
28 the world can, therefore, provide an important indicator of how the Community is per-
forming against not just the developed but also the developing countries. These trends 
were analysed for a  representative cross-section of 18  product groups for  the period 
1968-80.1 
The principal points which emerge from these data are that the Community has a growing 
market share in only 3 of the 18 product groups: motor vehicle bodies, engines and parts: 
24% of OECD imports in 1980; paper and paperboard: 7 %; and pulp and wastepaper: 
2%. 
On the other hand, the Community has a declining market share in 10 of the 18 product 
groups: passenger motor cars: 27 %; lorries and trucks:  17 %; organic chemicals: 34 %; 
plastic materials, regenerated cellulose and resins: 40 %; manufactured fertilizers: 11 %; 
iron and steel: 27 %; clothing and accessories: 13 %; made-up articles in textile material: 
11 %; ships and boats: 21 %; machine tools for working metals: 29%. 
The Community's important position in world trade is confirmed in the fact that it has the 
largest market share in 6 of the 18 product groups: organic chemicals: 34 %; plastic materi-
als, generated cellulose and resins: 40 %; iron and steel: 27 %; machine tools for working 
metals: 29 %; pharmaceuticals: 38 %; synthetic fibres: 37 %. However, the Community's 
share of the first 4 of these markets is  declining. 
The USA had a growing market share in only 3 of the 18 product groups: manufactured 
fertilizers:  22 %; clothing and accessories: 3 %; pulp and wastepaper: 18 %. 
Japan had a market share of more than 20% in only 4 of the 18 product groups: passenger 
motorcars: 42% and growing; lorries and trucks: 27 %and growing; ships and boats: 24% 
fluctuating/declining; machine tools for working metals: 21% and growing. 
Japan had a market share of 5% or less in 10 of the 18 product groups. 
The developing countries had the largest market share in 4 of the 18 product groups: inor-
ganic  chemicals:  25 %;  clothing  and  accessories:  48 %;  woven  cotton fabrics:  31 %; 
made-up articles of textile material: 33 %. 
This analysis of  both OECD export and import data also shows that there are in many cases 
significant fluctuations in shares and that these can and do change direction, both upwards 
and downwatds, over a relatively short time-scale. Nevertheless, the findings are suffi-
ciently consistent across a broad range of sectors and over a reasonably long time-scale to 
confirm that: 
(i)  the Community's performance varies considerably between sectors and markets; 
(ii)  the Community does not manifest dynamic market leadership in any sector; 
(iii)  the relatively small number and the nature of the sectors in which the Community's 
shares are growing and the volatility of its shares in most of the other sectors is a cause 
for some concern; 
(iv)  the USA would appear to be equally vulnerable in the majority of sectors; 
1  The product groups are defined in Annex 5. 
29 (  v)  whilst Japan has a strong position in some of  the sectors it has a negligible or relatively 
small share in the majority of markets in question. 
Both the United States and the Community export a wide range of products covering all 
sectors. AI though this provides no guarantee of  success against foreign competition-as re-
cent trends have shown-it does provide a solid base from which to develop international 
markets in the future. Japan, on the other hand, which has made remarkable gains in terms 
of  increased market shares, has staked its performance on a very limited number of  sectors, 
namely steel, office and telecommunications equipment, the precision engineering indus-
try and motor cars. 
The intrinsic risks of the Japanese strategy of concentrating on a narrow product range 
have evidently been more than offset by the resources - both financial and managerial-
which they have devoted to success in these chosen areas. 
C.  Industrial specialization 
An alternative approach to assessing changes in competitiveness is to measure changes in 
each country's and the Community's degree of trade specialization in each product group.1 
The computerized data base which has been used for this purpose includes intra-Commun-
ity trade in total OECD exports, contrary to the preceding discussion of market share data. 
1.  Specialization in international trade 
Tables 8 and 9 show the relative weight of exports and imports respectively, in relation to 
the relative weight of the product as a whole in total OECD trade. Thus in the case of 
Community trade in road vehicles in 1980: the weight of exports of vehicles in total Com-
munity exports was only 84% of the weight of total OECD exports of vehicles in total 
OECD trade. This low degree of specialization in exporting vehicles is declining. On the 
other hand, on the same basis the degree of dependence on imports is lower, at 51 %, but is 
rising. By sharp contrast, Japanese specialization in vehicle exports is rising rapidly and de-
pendence on imports is not rising at all. 
The most striking feature of these data is the narrow range of the specialization indices for 
Community exports. In 1980 the maximum was 1.23 (chemicals) and the minimum was 
0.56 (paper). Fifteen product groups fell within the range 0.80-1.20. This just means that 
the structure of Community exports of manufactured products is quite close to the average 
structure of OECD exports. The position has evolved little since 1963, if anything the 
range has narrowed. 
By contrast, the range of specialization indices in the USA and Japan is much wider and 
seems to be increasing. 
1  This approach was first developed in the report 'Changes in industrial structure in the European economies 
since the oil crisis 1973-78'- European Economy,  Special issue, 1979. 
30 Table 8 
lntlex of spedalization 
Community' 
1963  1 1973  1 198o 
Iron and steel  0.99 
Metal products  1.08 
Basic chemicals  0.99 
Chemical products  1.21 
Agricultural machinery  0.80 
Electr. machinery  1.16 
Power generating mach.  1.15 
Other machinery  1.07 
Office, telecom. equipment  0.95 
Opt., clock, photo  0.78 
Road vehicles  1.31 
Other transport equipment  0.78 
Textiles  0.94 
Clothing  0.99 
Shoes  1.05 
Paper  0.51 
Wood, furniture  0.65 
Plastic, rubber  0.98 
Other manufactured goods  0.86 
Total manufactures  1.00 
.  .  Source: Comm1sswn serv1ces on bas1s ofOECD trade data  . 
1  Extra-EC trade. 
1.01  0.96 
0.99  1.11 
1.12  1.08 
1.25  1.23 
1.03  1.10 
1.06  1.06 
1.03  1.15 
1.32  1.27 
0.74  0.71 
0.93  0.84 
0.96  0.84 
0.77  1.04 
0.95  0.87 
0.79  0.83 
1.16  1.06 
0.55  0.56 
0.62  0.84 
1.01  1.03 
1.08  1.22 
1.00  1.00 
USA  Japan 
1963  1 1973  1 198o  1963  1 1973  1 198o 
0.42  0.35  0.33  1.72  1.85  1.75 
0.84  0.74  0.70  1.06  0.89  0.80 
1.05  1.13  1.22  0.60  1.57  0.44 
1.14  1.07  1.14  0.38  0.26  0.25 
1.83  1.74  1.69  0.07  0.42  0.58 
1.03  1.24  1.07  0.75  0.88  1.20 
1.20  1.43  1.35  0.52  0.89  0.98 
1.24  1.16  1.17  0.39  0.57  0.75 
1.31  1.23  1.32  1.55  2.12  1.96 
1.11  1.30  1.27  0.95  1.09  1.36 
1.00  1.00  0.73  0.47  1.08  1.69 
1.43  1.79  2.33  1.32  1.78  0.91 
0.43  0.44  0.58  2.47  1.22  0.98 
0.27  0.25  0.37  2.05  0.45  0.13 
0.38  0.27  0.35  1.22  0.36  0.21 
0.80  0.79  0.76  0.35  0.25  0.24 
0.45  0.54  0.45  1.64  0.30  0.14 
1.11  0.82  0.79  0.90  0.81  0.67 
1.82  1.68  1.39  1.07  1.06  0.81 
1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
The Community has no export product to compare with US specialization in aircraft (2.03 
in 1980) and Japanese specialization in office and telecommunications equipment (1.96). 
On the other hand, for the indices of  import dependence there is less difference in the wider 
range observed for the Community, the USA and Japan, the last having the widest range, 
with a maximum for imports of chemicals (2.03) and a minimum for road vehicles (0.18). 
The Community's specialization in intermediate products has hardly changed since 1963 
with the exception of chemicals where the index has increased. Only for steel products is 
the index less than 1.00. The Community's specialization in machinery is above the OECD 
average, a decline in electrical machinery being offset by an increase in industrial machines. 
By contrast, specialization in equipment has been deteriorating, particularly for office and 
telecommunications equipment and road vehicles. As for consumer goods, we note low 
and generally declining specialization indices in the Community. 
The situation of the United States is rather different for although stability of the specializ-
ation index is the major characteristic, the levels of this index are very different to those of 
the Community. For chemicals the level and change of the index is similar to that for the 
Community, but that for the other base products is  much lower and falling sharply. For 
31 machinery the levels are also similar, while for the high technology group (except for vehi-
cles) they are far higher. 
The extreme case with rapid changes in index is Japan. Here between 1963 and 1973 a 
traditional less developed export structure was revolutionized. Slight falls  in general in 
basic products were countered by considerable increases in machinery. Very rapid in-
creases in the index for the higher technology sectors were contrasted to enormous falls in 
the index for the low technology groups. These trends were reinforced during 1973-79. In 
terms of levels the differences with the Community are particularly marked for high tech-
nology products and vehicles on the higher side and the low technology products on the 
other whereas the specialization remains weak for machinery exports, but not for electrical 
machines. In terms of the index of dependence, this pattern is exactly reversed with rising 
and high levels of import dependence for low technology products and falling  and low 
levels for several machinery branches, vehicles and office and telecommunications equip-
ment. 
This comparison suggests that the pattern of  industrial specialization in the Community has 
only partially moved in the direction of adjustment to changes in world demand and world 
supply. In certain sectors the Japanese specialization index has reached levels far in excess 
of those in either the Community or the USA. The United States had in 1963 a good 
specialization profile for an advanced industrialized country, and largely retained this pro-
32 
Table.9 
Index of dependence 
Community1 
1963  1 1973  1 198o 
Iron and steel  0.77 
Metal products  0.71 
Basic chemicals  1.12 
Chemical products  0.85 
Agricultural machinery  0.30 
Electr. machinery  1.00 
Power generating mach.  0.82 
Other machinery  0.98 
Office, telecom. equipment  1.05 
Opt., clock, photo  1.24 
Road vehicles  0.24 
Other transport equipment  1.02 
Textiles  0.87 
Clothing  0.95 
Shoes  1.03 
Paper  1.72 
Wood, furniture  1.26 
Plastic, rubber  0.98 
Other manufactured goods  2.10 
Total manufactures  1.00 
Source: Commission services on basis of OECD trade data. 
1 Extra-EC trade. 
0.89  0.79 
0.84  0.87 
1.13  1.00 
0.98  0.83 
0.48  0.42 
1.07  1.01 
0.67  0.69 
0.91  0.84 
1.30  1.37 
1.37  1.27 
0.33  0.51 
1.67  1.68 
1.07  1.20 
1.38  1.42 
1.28  1.21 
1.81  1.37 
1.30  1.13 
0.70  0.67 
1.32  1.43 
1.00  1.00 
USA  Japan 
1963  1 1973  1 198o  1963 · 1 1973  1 198o 
1.00  0.95  1.06  0.64  0.33  0.58 
1.05  0.91  0.84  0.42  0.48  0.58 
0.77  0.62  0.64  1.93  1.69  1.95 
0.56  0.40  0.60  2.30  1.94  2.03 
1.10  0.97  1.08  0.30  0.53  0.56 
0.49  0.85  1.07  0.77  0.95  1.10 
0.40  1.31  1.10  2.04  0.68  0.53 
0.31  0.52  0.77  1.81  1.00  0.89 
1.15  1.41  1.19  2.02  0.99  0.88 
0.89  0.78  0.86  1.67  1.45  1.50 
1.07  1.75  1.63  0.22  0.15  0.18 
0.35  0.55  0.85  1.87  1.15  1.90 
1.13  0.56  0.39  0.29  1.80  1.32 
1.78  1.17  1.16  0.17  1.36  1.09 
1.45  1.47  1.27  0.30  0.84  1.01 
2.20  1.02  0.92  0.15  0.55  0.71 
1.97  1.06  0.87  0.05  2.26  0.75 
0.34  0.54  0.47  1.11  0.65  0.73 
1.75  1.76  1.52  0.35  1.38  0.34 
1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 file through to 1979 having high specialization indices in important technology intensive 
sectors. Their main weakness is  that the index of dependence has risen sharply in some 
technology intensive areas and has fallen sharply for textiles, clothing and other low tech-
nology products. 
2.  Comparative advantage in high technology products 
We have also compared the Community's comparative advantage in exporting a selected 
group of high technology products  1 with that of Japan and the USA for the same products. 
This is done by calculating an index, similar to the specialization index but which measures 
the relative weight of exports of the high technology products in total exports of the Com-
munity compared with the weight of the Community's total exports in world trade. 
Table 10 below gives the resulting indices for the Community, the USA, Japan and the 
Member States. The results show even more striking differences than do the specialization 
indices, both between countries and over time. 
Table 10 
Changes in comparative advantage in exports of high technology products 
Total world manufacturing exports• 
1963  I  1970  I  1980 
Community2  1.02  0.94  0.88 
USA  1.29  1.27  1.20 
Japan  0.56  0.87  1.41 
Belgium/Luxembourg  0.67  0.77  0.79 
Denmark  0.58  0.60  0.66 
FR of  Germany  1.21  1.06  0.99 
France  1.00  1.06  0.93 
Ireland  0.43  0.67  1.03 
Italy  0.84  0.83  0.63 
The Netherlands  1.05  0.83  0.69 
UK  1.05  0.92  0.94 
Source: Commission services, DG II. 
1 Including intra-EC trade. 
2 See Annex 5. 
The low and declining comparative advantage of the Community may be somewhat exag-
gerated because the data unfortunately include intra-Community trade and, as we saw in 
Section II.A.2 above, intra-Community trade includes a larger proportion of low techno-
logy products than does extra-Community trade. 
Notwithstanding, these indices of comparative advantage confirm the rapid improvement 
in Japan's position for high technology products, as  against a moderate decline in the 
American position and a distinct deterioration on the part of the Community. 
1  See Annex 5. 
33 III. Costs, productivity and the exchange rate 
A.  Wage costs and productivity 
Considerable importance is generally attached to changes in unit wage costs - for want of 
details of  total production costs-because of  the theory that production costs determine the 
prices of goods, which in turn determine their competitiveness at home and abroad. Unit 
wage costs can be defined as the ratio of  the hourly money wage paid to hourly productivity 
in volume terms. Analysing them provides a key to determining the extent to which costs 
affect competitiveness and, hence, a country's foreign trade performance. Since the signifi-
cance of movements of unit wage costs varies depending on whether they are expressed in 
national currency or in a standard currency (i.e. the US dollar) or whether one considers 
manufacturing industry as a whole or its constituent branches, it makes sense to analyse the 
trends from each of those angles in turn. 
(a)  Wage costs 
Taking unit wage costs in national currency first, between 1970 and 1980 there were such 
wide differences in the trends for manufacturing industry as a whole in those countries for 
which figures are available, 1 that the countries split into two distinct groups. On the one 
hand Italy and the United Kingdom recorded average annual increases of  over 15 %, which 
means that hourly wage costs there rose by 15% more than hourly productivity in volume 
terms. On the other hand, there were the countries where wage increases exerted much less 
pressure- namely, Denmark with increases of 7.9 %, Belgium with 6.8 %, Japan with 
6.6 %, the Netherlands with 6.4 %, the FR of Germany with 5.5 %, the United States with 
6.2% and France occupied the middle ground with increases of 9.9 %. In the case of Bel-
gium, the steady deterioration in the current account since 1976 appears difficult to recon-
cile with the encouraging wage trends in that country since 1975. However, all in all the 
countries which have been most successful at controlling their wage costs have also had 
fewer balance-of-payments problems. 
The diverging paths taken by the individual countries in the 1970s (see Graphs 1a and 1b) 
illustrate the extent to which the base year chosen-which by implication is regarded as a 
year of stability-can affect the results. For instance, if 1970 is taken as the base year, the 
United Kingdom and Italy are in the worst position while Germany fares best, closely fol-
lowed by the Benelux countries, Japan and the United States. On the other hand, if 1975 is 
1  USA, Japan, Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, The Netherlands and United 
Kingdom. 
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 chosen the relative position of Italy and the United Kingdom remains unchanged, but 
Japan emerges with by far the best performance: an average annual increase in unit wage 
costs of only 0.2 %; followed by the Netherlands on 2.6 %, Belgium on 2.9% and the FR  of 
Germany on 4.2 %. At the same time the United States slips appreciably closer to the mid-
dle ground occupied by France with an average of 7.2% as against France's 8. 7 %. 
(b)  Hourly productivity 
Since, by definition, the hourly productivity in volume terms in manufacturing industry 
plays a central part in determining unit wage costs, it is also important to consider the ex-
tent to which it too can explain the differences in wage trends from one country to another. 
First, Table 11 shows that the countries with the highest growth in productivity (i.e. Bel-
gium, the Netherlands and Japan) have also had the best results in terms of  unit wage costs, 
whilst those where productivity increases have been slow have experienced the sharpest 
wage increases (e.g. the United Kingdom), except, however, in the case of the United 
States, which, paradoxically, combines good results as regards wage costs with a mediocre 
performance in terms of productivity. Germany, France and Italy do not entirely fit into 
this framework; the moderate increase in productivity in those countries was accompanied 
by below average, average and above average wage increases respectively. One cannot go 
so far as to say that productivity trends are inversely proportional to changes in unit wage 
costs, but rapid increases in productivity have a valuable moderating influence on unit 
wage costs,  though the case of the United States shows that this does not necessarily 
happen. 
On comparing the average increases in unit wage costs and those in hourly productivity in 
volume terms over the 1960s and 1970s, it is clear that the more or less general explosion of 
unit labour costs is only slightly due to lower growth in hourly productivity and is much 
more directly due to increases in hourly wage costs (wages plus social security contributions). 
Moreover, although the average values for each decade suggest that hourly productivity is 
growing slower than costs, the annual figures plotted in the graph neither prove nor dis-
prove the theory that there is an underlying downward trend in productivity. The sharp 
fluctuations in the figures, which mean among other things that the mean values are calcu-
lated over a period which begins with a boom year and finishes with a slump year, suggest 
that the mean value for the 1970s might be too low and that the real figure is closer to the 
1960s level. At any event, it does not seem that a fall in the rate of growth of productivity 
could have heen at the root of the competitiveness problems experienced in the 1970s. 
(c)  Unit wage costs 
The sectoral analysis of unit wage costs in 13 branches of industry in six Community coun-
tries 1 revealed that the trends in both unit costs and hourly productivity in volume terms 
were to  a  very large extent heterogeneous from one sector and from one country to 
1  Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, The Netherlands and United Kingdom. 
37 Table  11 
W•  costs aacl produdivity, _....ualarowtb rates, in  Ofo 1 
1960-70  1970-80  1973-80  1975-80 
Hourly  wage costs in national currencies 
Belgium  9.8  15.0  13.0  9.4 
Denmark  11.1  13.5  12.6  10.9 
France  8.7  15.3  15.3  14.2 
FR of  Germany  8.6  10.9  9.7  8.6 
Italy  11.1  20.8  20.0  17.9 
The Netherlands  12.0  13.6  11.3  9.3 
United Kingdom  7.1  18.0  19.0  17.2 
EC7
2  9.0  15.8  15.4  13.8 
USA  4.5  8.8  9.3  8.9 
Japan  13.5  14.5  11.0  8.1 
Hourly productivity in volume 
Belgium  6.4  7.4  6.6  6.8
3 
Denmark  6.8  5.2  4.4  3.8 
France  6.1  4.9  4.9  5.1 
FR of Germany  5.7  5.2  4.8  4.2 
Italy  7.1  4.5  3.5  4.9 
The Netherlands  7.1  6.4  5.5  6.6
3 
United Kingdom  4.2  2.2  1.4  1.9 
EC7  5.8  4.5  3.8  4.2 
USA  2.9  2.4  1.7  1.6 
Japan  10.5  7.4  7.2  7.9 
Unit wage costs in national cu"encies 
Belgium  3.2  6.8  6.1  2.9 
Denmark  4.0  7.9  7.8  6.8 
France  2.4  9.9  10.0  8.7 
FR of  Germany  2.7  5.5  4.7  4.2 
Italy  3.7  15.6  16.0  12.4 
The Netherlands  4.6  6.4  5.4  2.6 
United Kingdom  2.8  15.5  17.3  15.0 
EC7  3.0  10.8  11.2  9.2 
USA  1.5  6.2  7.5  7.2 
Japan  2.7  6.6  3.6  0.2 
Unit wage costs in USD 
Belgium  3.2  12.0  10.7  7.7 
Denmark  3.0  11.4  9.5  7.2 
France  1.7  12.4  11.0  9.0 
FR of  Germany  3.4  13.2  11.2  10.7 
Italy  3.6  10.9  9.6  6.5 
The Netherlands  4.8  12.5  10.7  7.6 
United Kingdom  1.0  12.9  15.5  16.1 
EC7  2.6  12.4  11.8  10.5 
USA  1.5  6.2  7.5  7.2 
Japan  2.8  11.9  8.5  5.8 
1 Calculated on the basis oflogarithmic trend of index. 
2 Excluding Ireland, Luxembourg and Greece. 
J 1975-79. 
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 another. As regards the possible link between unit wage costs in the individual sectors and 
foreign trade performance, the results vary considerably, depending on the category of 
products concerned. In the case of intermediate products for instance, foreign trade per-
formance seems to be linked to wage costs. Conversely, there is no evidence of any such 
link in the case of capital goods; naturally, this does not necessarily mean that there is in 
fact no such link but it nevertheless indicates that foreign trade depends equally heavily on 
a wide range of qualitative factors, among which the size of the home market and strength 
of the world market seem to play a decisive part. Finally, there is no obvious link between 
costs and the foreign trade performance in the food products or current consumer goods 
sectors either. However, the textiles, leather and clothing industry is one notable exception 
since the relative increase in wage costs in each country directly determines how much of  its 
share of the world market it loses. 
Conversion of the unit wage costs from the national currency into US dollars lends greater 
depth to the results and illustrates the important part which changes in the exchange rate 
play in determining the relative trends in production costs and, hence, in foreign trade. 
The importance of the exchange rate emerges only after 1970; the stable exchange rates of 
the 1960s mean that the results for that period hardly change if they are converted from the 
national currency to US dollars, except in the case of the United Kingdom and, to a lesser 
extent, France. Since then, however, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system has made 
way for sharp fluctuations in parities with the result that national changes in unit wage costs 
as such have surrendered most of their importance to fluctuations in exchange rates, which, 
in turn, are broadly affected by wage costs. 
For instance, the differences between the national trends between 1970 and 1980 emerge 
clearly when the figures are expressed in the national currencies but are partly obscured 
when US dollars are used (see Graph 3). The depreciation of the dollar has put the United 
States in an extremely advantageous position compared with all the other countries. Its 
average annual increase in unit wage costs stood at 6.2 %, while the figure for the other 
countries ranged from 10.9% in Italy to 13.2% in Germany. Consequently, the country 
which has been most successful at containing its unit wage costs at home comes last but one 
if the figures are converted into US dollars, slightly above the United Kingdom where the 
changes in exchange parity have not sufficed to counteract the combined impact of the 
large wage increases and low growth in productivity caused, in particular, by the rapid ap-
preciation of the pound since 1978. If  the figures are expressed in US dollars, Japan and 
Italy maintain the same advantage over all the other  countries except, of  course, the United 
States. 
The Benelux countries and France come between Japan and Italy at the top and Germany 
at the bottom. Consequently, when wage costs are expressed in US dollars, the situation no 
longer appears to be the same in those countries performing poorly in this area and those 
which have structural balance-of-payments problems as it seems to be the same when they 
are given in national currencies. 
Although one cannot draw any practical conclusions from this, it nevertheless raises a 
number of questions. Firstly, it serves as a reminder of the limitations of analyses such as 
this, in view of the fact that they are based on wage costs rather than on total production 
costs, that the figures are converted into the standard currency at the exchange rate for the 
dollar rather than at the effective exchange rate (see Section III.B) and that virtually 
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 nothing is  known about the currency actually used for payment purposes. Over and above 
these  questions  of the  method  employed,  there  is  another  fundamental  question  to be 
answered-namely,  if firm control over production costs at home enhances the country's 
competitive position and, hence, its foreign trade performance, why does fluctuation in the 
exchange  rate cancel  out or even  negate the resultant  advantages or disadvantages?  Is  it 
because  the  wage  cost  trends  for  the  products  on  which  a  country's  foreign  trade 
performance hinges differ from those for industry as  a whole?  Or is  it because there is  a 
large range of products whose competitiveness does  not depend primarily on price,  which 
would normally be determined by the costs in one way or another? 
Or could it be that the competitive position of a country depends more on the size and state 
of health of its economy and that wage costs in national currency should be interpreted as 
only one indicator of health? 
Whatever the answer, one can appreciate the importance of factors which are not directly 
linked to costs and prices, i.e. all the qualitative factors which affect a country's foreign 
trade. What is  more, these factors seem to grow in importance as the products become 
more distinctive and more sophisticated, as is the case with industrial machinery, for ex-
ample. 
Finally, perhaps there is no immediate link between production costs and prices. If  one ac-
cepts that prices on the various world markets are determined by supply and demand and 
by the other special features of  each market (i.e. demand patterns, taxation and so forth), it 
seems feasible that firms and industries from certain countries might achieve good results 
regardless (to some extent) of  their costs. Nevertheless even this path leads back to the cen-
tral importance of costs. A' though they might not have a direct influence on foreign trade 
performance, in conjunction with prices they affect the profitability of production and, by 
extension, the potential for investment and for increasing productivity and, ultimately, the 
industry's chances of survival and of competing on world markets in the long term. 
B.  Competitiveness and the 'real' exchange rate 
Since the end of the era of fixed exchange rates in 1972 both exchange rates and price and 
cost inflation differentials have diverged sharply. Some Community countries have be-
come associated with relatively low rates of inflation accompanied by rising exchange rates 
-normally Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium/Luxembourg-whilst others have ex-
perienced relatively high inflation rates and falling exchange rates- namely the UK, Italy 
and Ireland. The net effect of these diverse movements on international cost and price 
competitiveness has, as a consequence, been difficult to assess. A number of technical ap-
proaches have been developed to allow us to measure the extent to which movements in the 
exchange rates of a currency have been offset by (opposite) movements in its relative 
domestic cost and price levels (as against its principal competitors). These measures are of-
ten referred to as indicators of  the 'real' exchange rate of a currency, or of the cost and price 
competitiveness of a country. 
The 'real' exchange rate is of  course purely conceptual; one cannot, for example, hold 'real' 
(in this sense) German marks. There are also considerable technical difficulties in their 
compilation and interpretation. For compilation one needs, ideally, a cost and price indi-
42 cator of tradeable goods and services; such indicators do not exist and therefore we use 
proxies such as the wholesale prices of manufactured goods to reflect price competitive-
ness, or unit labour costs in manufacturing to reflect cost competitiveness. The availability, 
quality, timeliness and coverage of these proxies vary from country to country and over 
time. Interpretation of the results is restricted because these indicators of 'real' exchange 
rates can only show us the magnitude and direction of changes; they tell us nothing about 
the levels of the 'real' exchange rate in itself. Conclusions about the appropriateness of the 
level - and indeed the changes themselves - are the product of judgment. 
Nevertheless, certain useful conclusions can be drawn from an examination of the data on 
price competitiveness, 1 based on the wholesale prices of manufactures, between 1970 and 
1980 as detailed in the table below: 
Table 12 
Changes U. 'real' exclumge rates between 1970 anti$ 
!"') 
Indicators of  D  F  UK  I  NL  B/L  DK  IRL  USA  Japan 
Relative prices  -54  +5  +77  +98  -28  -41  -2  +29  +10  -21 
multiplied by 
Effective exchange rate  +65  -2  -35  -96  +32  +24  +2  -39  -26  +32 
equals 
'Real' exchange rate  +  7  +3  +31  +  1  +  3  -14  +1  - 8  -16  +7 
Source: Commission services, DG II. 
Note: a plus sign ( +) means that the 'real' exchange rate has risen; 
a negative sign (-) means that the 'real' exchange rate has fallen. 
In every case the effective exchange rate has moved in the opposite direction to relative 
prices thereby confirming the view that the 'real' exchange rate is more stable in the longer 
term than the effective (or nominal) exchange rate; thus the exchange rate moves to offset 
inflation differentials in the longer term. 
However, it is clear that these offsetting movements have been incomplete not only over 
the longer term, but even more so during shorter periods. 
(a)  The secular movements 
We have already seen from Table 12 that, inter alia,  'real' exchange rate movements have 
tended to be restrained by nominal or effective excha"i}ge rate movements at least when 
measured over a number of  years. The problem is that any one period could be unrepresen-
tative of the general development of a 'real' exchange rate. It  is therefore useful to put the 
period chosen into a longer-term context where underlying economic forces have had time 
1  It  has become a convention to use wholesale prices of manufacturing as the basis for a 'quick' estimate of the 
'real' exchange rate; however, other cost and price indicators can be used, and tend to tell the same story. 
43 to 'average out' the cyclical movements. For this purpose the period chosen is the decade of 
the 1970s. 1 
Table 13 below shows the indicator of the 'real' exch~nge  rates as compared to the average 
of the 1970s for the Member States (excluding Greece), the USA and Japan. 
Table 13 
'Real' rates of exchange 
(1970-79 = 100) 
D  F  UK  I  NL  B/L  DK  IRL  USA  Japan 
1970  92  102  100  103  94  102  82  104  114  92 
1980  99  105  131  104  97  90  93  97  96  98 
1981  90  100  131  99  93  82  89  94  111  103 
1981 (4th 
quarter)  91  99  124  98  96  81  92  98  112  100 
..  Source: Commission services, DG II. 
Note: A rise in the index means an increase in the 'real' rate of  exchange and vice versa. 
For the Community as a whole there have been substantial gains in price competitiveness 
between 1980 and 1981, and by the fourth quarter of 1981-the latest date for which data 
are available-these gains had been retained. Over the same period both the USA, in par-
ticular, and Japan had lost price competitiveness. 
In the longer-term context it appears that Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium/Luxem-
bourg, Denmark and Ireland  2  are substantially more price competitive than in the 1970s 
whilst both the UK and the USA have lost out considerably on this front. For France, Italy 
and Japan little has changed. 
(b)  The cyclical movements 
There have been two distinct cycles in Community and world exchange rates in the 1970s, 
with both the German mark and the yen tending to rise strongly up to before the first and 
second oil price hikes and then experiencing sharp falls. These movements have been par-
ticularly strong against the US dollar. In general the movements of the German mark have 
tended to take the continental European currencies with it and as a consequence of all this 
'real' exchange rates in the Community-as measured on a quarterly basis-have tended to 
fluctuate in a wide band frequently exceeding 20% in total during the period 1970 to 1980 
or 1981. In addition these movements have happened rather rapidly and usually after 
periods of relative stability, such that the 'real' exchange rate may move by, say, 5% per 
quarter over one year or so. 
1  Although this is an arbitrary period it includes almost completely the two currency and current external balance 
cycles of  the German mark and the yen whilst balancing two years (1970 and 1971) of an 'overvalued' US dollar 
with two years (1978 and 1979) of an 'undervalued' US dollar. In addition the Community as a whole was in 
broad current external equilibrium (with a current balance of + 0.1% of GDP) over that period. 
This result has to be interpreted with great care since Ireland has undoubtedly gained against the UK but lost 
against its continental competitors. 
44 To illustrate the above remarks it is useful to examine the developments since 1970 of the 
'real' German mark-the second most widely held and traded currency after the US dollar. 
The 'real' exchange rate of the German mark has been subjected to considerable swings 
during the period from 1970 onwards (see Graph 4). On the basis of quarterly data the 'real' 
rate has seen rises of 17.5 % in four quarters - or more than 4 % per quarter - in the 
period from the third quarter of 1972 to the third quarter of 1Y73-just before the first oil 
price hike-to be followed by a total fall of 15.5 %in the nine quarters to the fourth quarter 
of 1975-or about 1.5% per quarter. The real rate then drifted up moderately at a rate of 
about 1 %per quarter to remain at a rate within 5 % of  its average value in the 1970s from 
the fourth quarter of 1978 to the fourth quarter of 1979; thereafter it started its sharp fall of 
14%-or more than 2.5% a quarter-in the five quarters to early 1981. The real rate in 
1981. was some 10% below the average of the 1970s and a little lower than in 1970 itself. 
Graph4: 
The 'real'  German mark 
1970-79 =  100 
llO 
105 
100 
95 
90 
Source: Commission services, DG II. 
By and large the 'real' German mark has moved within a range of (+)plus 13% and(-) 
minus 13% - a total range of 26% of its average value in the 1970s. 
The German experience of a strongly fluctuating 'real' exchange rate has been far from 
unique,  as  can  be  seen  from  Table  14  which  gives  the  maximum  band  within  which 
the quarterly estimates of the 'real' exchange rate indicators have fluctuated. By and large 
European currencies have tended to vary within a total band of about 20%-with the ex-
ception of the 'real' pound sterling which, due to its recent rise, has moved about within a 
band of more than 50%. The relative instability of the real dollar and yen-at least in com-
parison with the non-sterling European currencies - is  to be noted. 
The implications for trade and competitiveness of such fluctuating real exchange rates are 
difficult to measure as these more violent movements have occurred simultaneously with 
45 Table 14 
The l'llllle of  the 'real' exclumge rate as compared to the avenge of 1970-79 
-1978-81-
(%) 
D  F  UK  I  NL  B/L  DK  IRL  USA  Japan 
Quarterly maximum  +13  +  7  +39  +10  +  8  +4  +  8  +  6  +20  +23 
Quarterly minimum  -13  -12  -15  - 8  - 8  -18  -15  -11  -12  -15 
Total range  26  19  54  18  16  22  23  17  32  38 
.  .  Source: Comm1ss1on services, DG II  . 
new shocks to the world economy, namely the first and second oil price hikes, divergent 
and accelerating rates of  inflation and a world-wide rise in unemployment. Nevertheless it 
must be said that by and large the direction of these 'real' exchange rate movements has 
been consistent with underlying economic factors, particularly the external current bal-
ances. 
However,  it is  sometimes held that the equilibrating influence of real exchange  rate 
changes has been thwarted as economic agents have seen that 'real' rate changes have not 
been sustained in even the medium term (say, up to five years) and have been unwilling to 
base investment decisions on cost and price signals which may turn against them just at the 
crucial moment. Such considerations are particularly important for international competi-
tiveness with large-scale projects that take many years from conception to completion. 
(c)  Short-term movements 
Short-term variations in nominal (or effective) exchange rates have increased strongly in 
the past decade as the world-wide system of fixed but adjustable exchange rates gave way 
to floating rate regimes and the emergence of ad hoc and geographical exchange rate ar-
rangements.  Table  15  details  the  average  change  in  (effective)  exchange  rates  be-
tween ends of month for the three-year periods 1967-69, 1970-72, 1973-75, 1976-78 
and for the latest period available  1979-80. Full calculations  for  1981  are not yet  avail-
able. 
It  is clear that short-term variability of exchange rates has increased dramatically since the 
final collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1972; before then the typical change in ex-
change rates between ends of month was about 0.5 % and somewhat less for the US dollar 
which remains the main point of reference and in which the largest volumes of currency 
transactions are conducted. Since 1972 currency variability has quadrupled to 2 % per 
month on average (and indeed in the first month of 1981 exceeded 4 %per month). As the 
US dollar has become both absolutely and relatively (to the average and the continental 
European currencies) more unstable over time it has increased instability in the parities of 
the rest of the world's currencies. 
It  is interesting to note that the variability of the EMS currencies since the beginning of the 
exchange rate arrangements in spring 1979 has by and large been reduced both absolutely 
and relative to the average, the US dollar and the Japanese yen. 
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Mean eft'edive exchanp rate cbauges .. up or down - between encls of month 
(%) 
1967-69  1970-72  1973-75  1976-78  1979-80 
FR. of  Germany  0.58  0.60  2.23  1.88  1.86 
France  0.59  0.55  2.16  1.70  1.64 
United Kingdom  0.67  0.60  0.97  2.51  2.46 
Italy  0.33  0.44  1.90  2.29  1.63 
The Netherlands  0.33  0.54  1.98  1.75  1.61 
Belgium/Luxembourg  0.32  0.45  1.80  1.71  1.61 
USA  0.30  0.49  2.35  1.98  2.36 
Japan  0.30  0.57  2.01  2.24  3.29 
Sweden  0.30  0.44  1.77  1.81  1.53 
Switzerland  0.40  0.63  2.42  2.48  2.09 
Canada  0.35  0.69  2.08  2.32  2.07 
Unweighted 
average  0.42  0.56  2.06  2.06  2.02 
.  .  Source: CommiSSIOn serv1ces, DG II . 
Of course, when inflation rates proceed at different rates from one country to another one 
would expect exchange rate variability to reflect the normal pattern of the exchange rate 
falling to offset higher inflation rates and vice versa. It  could be argued that the increased 
variability of nominal (or effective) exchange rates as in the table reflects these offsetting 
price movements and that real exchange rates (on a monthly basis) are stable, both in abso-
lute terms and over time. Evidence does not, however, bear this out; indeed the contrary is 
the case with inflation differentials being reinforced by exchange rate changes on balance. 
Table 16 details the same information as above but with exchange rate changes adjusted 
for inflation rate differentials. 
Table 16 
Mean real exchange rate changes - up or down - between ends of month 
(%) 
1967-69  1970-72  1973-75  1976-78  1979-80 
FR. of Germany  1.09  0.77  2.46  1.96  2.12 
France  1.27  0.90  2.10  2.76  2.87 
Italy  0.80  0.67  2.16  2.23  1.87 
The Netherlands  0.96  0.95  2.26  2.00  2.02 
Belgium/Luxembourg  0.81  0.76  2.01  1.86  1.81 
USA  0.77  0.75  2.66  2.12  2.64 
Japan  0.81  0.83  2.35  2.27  3.23 
Sweden  0.74  0.72  1.94  2.06  1.73 
Canada  0.82  0.80  2.42  2.38  2.29 
Unweighted 
average  0.96  0.82  2.29  2.24  2.25 
Source: Comms1ss1on serv1ces, DG II. 
47 IV.  The evidence from industry 
As we have seen from the previous chapter, the Community is the largest trading area in 
the world accounting for 19% of world exports and 20% of world imports in 1980, even 
after domestic inter-State trade has been excluded. Furthermore, the share of world trade 
in manufactured products is even higher, 26.5% in 1980 compared with 16% for the USA 
and 14% for Japan. In 1980, 84% of the Community's exports were manufactured prod-
ucts, which is why this report focuses on the structure and performance of manufacturing 
industry. This point of view is inevitably incomplete in so far as agricultural exports are a 
significant element in the Community's trade, and because the development of tertiary or 
services activities is  becoming an increasingly important fact in the development of the 
domestic economy. However, for the time being, and indeed for the foreseeable future, the 
international competitive position of the Community's economy will depend overwhelm-
ingly on the performance of manufacturing industry. 
In this part of the report, we examine the structure of manufacturing industry in the Com-
munity, the resources used in industry, particularly capital and labour, from a quantitative, 
and where possible, a qualitative point of view. 
This assessment is inevitably not exhaustive because the competitiveness of a firm is very 
much affected by the technology incorporated in its capital equipment, by the education 
and training of its employees and by its management and financial structure. There is no 
simple way of measuring and relating the effects of these different factors. 1 
A.  The structure of  industry in the  Community 
In the first place it is useful to have an overall picture of  the size and structure of industry in 
the Community, and the relative importance of  the principal sectors in each Member State. 
Manufacturing industry accounts for about 30 %of GDP in the Community; this share has 
been rather stable since 1970. The largest sectors in 1979 were, the agricultural industries 
(food, beverages and tobacco) which accounted for 14% of value added in manufacturing, 
and chemicals, metal products, industrial machines, electrical goods and transport equip-
ment, accounting for 9-10 % each. 
The shares of the different sectors in total value added in manufacturing industry have 
changed slowly during the 1970s. A few sectors such as chemicals and transport equipment 
1  See 'Research on productivity growth and productivity difference', R. R. Nelson, Journal of  Economic Litera-
ture, September 1981, for a review of recent literature on this subject. 
49 have increased in relative importance, whereas textiles, leather and clothing have declined 
quite rapidly and food, beverages and tobacco declined more slowly. 
Value  added in  comparatively  advanced  sectors  such  as  industrial  machines,  office 
machines and electrical goods have grown rather more slowly  than might have been ex-
pected, considering the above-average rate of growth of investment in these sectors. 
Table 17 shows the structure of industry in the Member States in 1979. The most striking 
feature is the wide distribution of  activities among the Member States. Individual sectors in 
individual Member States are by and large quite small in relation to the overall position. 
Table 17 
MaaufaduriDa Industry In the Commaalty by sec:tor and Member State In 1979 
Total  B  D  F  I  NL  EUR61 
Value added in manufactured 
products  100  2  3.77  38.23  22.96  14.82  4.20 
of  which: 
Metallic minerals  5.66  0.31  2.04  1.23  0.90  0.18 
Non-metallic minerals  5.79  0.23  2.19  1.27  1.03  0.23 
Chemicals  9.48  0.41  3.74  2.11  1.20  0.63 
Metal products  9.25  0.32  3.96  2.57  1.09  0.36 
Industrial machines  9.77  0.32  4.59  1.66  1.08  0.33 
Office machines  2.98  0.01  1.49  0.59  0.23  0.06 
Electrical goods  9.08  0.33  4.18  1.69  0.99  0.49 
Transport equipment  9.91  0.33  3.18  3.28  0.99  0.24 
Food, beverages and tobacco  14.12  0.60  4.75  3.65  1.90  0.73 
Textiles, leather goods, clothing  8.73  0.33  2.20  1.89  2.73  0.18 
Paper and paper products  6.24  0.20  2.37  1.21  0.88  0.44 
Rubber and plastic products  3.72  0.11  1.66  0.77  0.58  0.10 
Other manufactured products  5.28  0.25  1.89  1.04  1.21  0.24 
Source: Eurostat + DG II. 
Note: Data in national currencies converted to ECU at current exchange rates before calculation of  percentages. 
1 Not including Denmark, Ireland and Greece. 
2 100% = 493500 million ECU (338000 million ECU, 1975 prices). 
(%) 
UK 
16.01 
1.00 
0.82 
1.39 
0.95 
1.77 
0.60 
1.40 
1.89 
2.49 
1.41 
1.13 
0.50 
0.65 
At the given level of disaggregation, no individual sector in any one Member State accounts 
for more than 5% of value added in manufacturing in the Community. On the other hand 
six sectors in Germany account for more than 2.5% of  value added in manufacturing; three 
in France and only one in Italy. A very large proportion of total manufacturing activity is in 
Germany (38 %), followed by France (23 %), the United Kingdom (16 %) and by Italy 
(15 %). 
50 B.  Resources and the factors of  production 
1.  Investment in manufacturing industry 
Total gross investment in the Community economy is of the order of 20% of GDP. How-
ever, investment in manufacturing industry is only about 3% of GDP. Thus it is a small, if 
crucial component of domestic product. The indications are that it is  stagnating in the 
Community compared with continued growth in Japan. 
The real measure of the capital used in industry is the stock of capital. This is determined 
not only by the rate of investment, but by the cumulative results of past investment. How-
ever, the measures of capital stock are at best very approximate because its amortization  1 
has to be estimated and because definitions differ between countries. 2 
Table 18 compares investment in manufacturing in the Community with Japan and the 
United States for the years 1970, 197  5 and 1979. In recent years the relative positions have 
been similar, although Japan's leading position was even more striking during the 1960s. 
Table 18 
Investment in manufadoriDg 
(1975 prices and exchange rates) 
Community 
197o  1  1975  1 
Total investment 
1000 million ECU  229 
o/oofGDP  24 
Manufacturing 
investment 
o/oofGDP  5.2 
%of total 
investment  23 
1000 million ECU (approx.)  53 
Source: US National Accounts ED A-Aggregates. 
Japan - Economic Planning Agency. 
Eurostat. 
236 
22 
3.8 
18 
42 
Japan 
1979  1970  I  1975  1 
263  111  131 
21  35  32 
3.0  9.6  6.1 
15  27  19 
39  30  25 
USA 
1979  197o  1  1975  I  1979 
170  202  201  255 
33  18  16  17 
5.2  2.8  2.1  2.6 
16  13  13  14 
27  26  26  36 
These data show up the higher level of manufacturing investment in Japan in relation to the 
size of their economy, with the result that the stock of capital in Japanese manufacturing 
industry has rapidly caught up with the Community and the United States. 
In recent years, manufacturing investment has not been a buoyant element in the Com-
munity economy. Table 19 shows the well-known substantial differences between the 
Member States, and unimpressive trends with the exception of the Federal Republic of 
1  i.e. the rate at which existing capital is being used up or scrapped. 
2  The widespread, but by no means uniform practice of  leasing factories and equipment affects the comparability 
of investment and capital stock data in manufacturing industry. 
51 1975 
(I 000 million 
ECU) 
FR of  Germany  13.33 
France  10.06 
Italy  6.72 
The Netherlands2  2.20 
Belgium  2.21 
Luxembourg  0.13 
United Kingdom  6.09 
Ireland  0.38 
Source: Eurostat. 
1 Denmark: not available. 
Table 19 
Manufacturing investment in the Commonity1 
(Volume index,1975 =  100) 
1970  1975  1976  1977 
146  100  106  108 
103  100  108  102 
110  100  97  98 
113  100  90  104 
99  100  88  73 
117  100  80  106 
116  100  95  100 
74  100  99  102 
2 The Netherlands: including energy and construction. 
1978  1979  1980 
108  119  127 
100  ..  .. 
91  100  .. 
108  105  .. 
71  72  .. 
..  ..  .. 
107  111  100 
136  ..  .. 
Germany and-on a different scale-Ireland. Among the larger Member States, the abso-
lute level of manufacturing investment in France and Germany is about twice as high as it is 
in Italy and the UK. 
The low and, in several Member States, the stagnant or declining level of manufacturing in-
vestment is not just a reflection of  the recession since 197  5. There has also been a shift in all 
major industrialized areas, including the Community, towards service activities, and the 
level of investment in certain established capital intensive industries has been declining 
(steel, chemicals, refining, etc.), whereas the technological improvements of micro-elec-
tronics applications, for example, permit substantial productivity improvements in certain 
activities with relatively little investment. 
Three sectors account for 40 % of  all manufacturing investment in the Community:  1 chem-
ical products, transport equipment and food, beverages and tobacco. Among the Member 
States, in 1978, the Federal Republic accounted for about 35% of manufacturing invest-
ment and France, Italy and the United Kingdom together for about 52 %. 
Table 20 shows the distribution of manufacturing investment by Member State and sector 
in 1978. 
For the same sectors and countries the trends in manufacturing investment are presented in 
Table 21  in the form of average annual rates of change. 
The changes in the rate of investment by sector are of  interest because they are a direct in-
dication of  changes in industrial structure which may not yet be apparent in the structure of 
value added and exports. The data have to be treated with caution because small and fluc-
tuating changes do not necessarily reveal a definite trend. That is why in Table 21 the rates 
of change which are not significant have been put in brackets. Notwithstanding these un-
certainties, certain definite trends do emerge, particularly for the Community as a whole. 
1  Not including Luxembourg, Ireland, Denmark and Greece, for which the data are not available on this basis. 
52 Table 20 
Manufactming investments by Member State and branch (1978) 
(%of  total manufacturing investments
1 at current prices, current exchange rates) 
Total2  Member States 
Sector 
Manufacturing investments 
Metallic minerals 
Non-metallic minerals 
Chemical products 
Metal products 
Agricul. and industr. machines 
Office machines 
Electrical goods 
Transport equipment 
Food, beverages, tobacco 
Textile, clothing, leath~r 
Paper, printing products 
Rubber, plastic products 
Other manufactur. products 
Source: Eurostat 1981, National accounts by branch. 
Note: 100%  =  53 790 million ECU. 
I  NACER25. 
2 Not including Denmark, Ireland and Greece. 
EUR6  D 
100  38.64 
7.78  2.02 
7.14  3.08 
14.75  4.81 
6.48  2.91 
7.89  3.59 
3.64  1.58 
7.85  3.41 
12.33  4.94 
13.43  4.76 
4.76  1.55 
5.94  2.32 
3.17  1.53 
4.83  2.16 
Table 21 
I  F  I  I  I 
NL 
22.66  13.34  6.15 
2.13  1.68  0.18 
1.63  0.99  0.45 
2.56  2.06  1.52 
1.56  0.78  0.34 
1.41  1.00  0.25 
1.52  0.22  0.09 
1.67  0.96  0.55 
3.25  1.88  0.28 
3.03  1.20  1.45 
0.90  1.09  0.18 
1.29  0.57  0.47 
0.73  0.49  0.11 
0.97  0.43  0.28 
Trends in EC manufacturing investments by branch 
Average annual changes for the period 1970-79 
D  F  I  NL  B 
Ferrous and non-ferrous ores 
and metals, other than 
radioactive  -4.4  ( -2.6)  -5.8  -16.8  -8.4 
Non-metallic minerals and 
mineral products  ( -2.5)  2.5  ( -0.2)  4.0  (0.4) 
Chemical products  (0.5)  (-1.1)  ( -2.5)  - 3.4  (0.8) 
Metal products, except 
machinery and transport 
equipment  (0.8)  -4.4  3.4  (0.2) 
Agricultural and 
industrial machinery  (0.5)  5.7  3.6  1.6  (5.0) 
Office and data-processing 
machines, precision and 
optical instruments  2.1  4.9  (3.6)  (2) 
Electrical goods  2.7  5.4  7.3  (  1.5)  (0.7) 
Transport equipment  2.6  4.6  (1.6)  (- 1.5)  3.6 
Food, beverages, tobacco  (0.7)  (0.1)  2.3  5.3  6.2 
Textile and clothing, leather 
and footwear  -3.7  -6.6  2.5  - 3.5  -6.4 
Paper and printing products  (1.5)  (0.5)  2.0  5.2  (4.8) 
Rubber and plastic products  ( -1.2)  -5.7  -4.2  5.9  3.6 
Other manufacturing 
products  (-0.9)  ( -0.6)  3.1  5.5  ( -0.6) 
..  Source: CommiSSion services, DG III, based on National accounts by branch,  Eurostat 1981. 
Note: The brackets indicate that the correlation coefficient in the linear regression is low. 
I  Greece and Denmark excluded. 
L 
(+  1.7) 
+34.7 
(- 3.6) 
-15.1 
(0) 
+24 
-19.8 
(- 0.8) 
-15 
+37 
-20.4 
( +  1.8) 
I  B 
3.68 
0.20 
0.35 
0.72 
0.16 
0.24 
0.00 
0.19 
0.22 
0.72 
0.23 
0.30 
0.13 
0.23 
UK 
(-2.7) 
( -1.5) 
(1.0) 
(0.2) 
2.1 
(1.0) 
1.7 
(2.5) 
(0.6) 
-6.6 
(1.0) 
-9.8 
(0.5) 
I  UK 
15.53 
1.58 
0.66 
3.09 
0.75 
1.41 
0.23 
1.06 
1.75 
2.28 
0.82 
0.99 
0.18 
0.76 
ECI 
-3.65 
-1.95 
(  0.44) 
( -0.58) 
1.92 
3.27 
-3.21 
2.43 
1.48 
-4.1 
(0.77) 
-3.3 
(0) 
53 Thus it appears ~hat considerable adjustment has in fact been taking place in the relative 
importance of the branches, in terms of investment effort. In several cases the structural 
adjustments implied by such changes are quite salient, particularly the decline in invest-
ment in textiles and clothing and rubber and plastics industries. On the other hand, invest-
ment has definitely been rising rapidly in office equipment and electrical goods. It  is also 
likely that investment in metal industries has been declining and investment in transport 
equipment has been rising at about the rates indicated in Table 21. 
In this context the overall movements in the rate of  investment make sense in terms of  what 
we know about the general direction of structural change in Community industry. There 
are, however, striking differences in particular sectors in individual Member States, such as 
the dramatic decline in investment in the metals industries in the Netherlands, the modest 
UK  performance  in  office  and  electrical  goods  and  growing  investment  in  textiles  and 
clothing in Italy. 
Over time, the effect of very different rates of  investment result in different capital stock in 
the manufacturing industries of different countries, illustrated in Table 22. 
Table 22 
Manufacturln& capital stock in the Community, USA and Japaa at constant 1970 prices and 
exdumge rates 
(Buildings and equipment) 
Capital stock  Avemgemte  Capital stock 
in manufacturing  of  increase  per employee1 
1000 million ECU  %per year  1000ECU 
1970  J  1975  1965-70  I  1970-75  1970  I  1975 
Belgium  15.5  20.8  6.5  6.1  13  20 
FR of  Germany  121.6  159.5  6.5  5.6  13  19 
France  75.8  100.2  5.2  5.7  15  18 
Italy  55.6  71.1  3.9  5.0  12  15 
The Netherlands  19.5  25.5  7.8  5.5  17  25 
United Kingdom  71.4  83.4  4.2  3.2  9  11 
Community
1  359.1  460.4  5.4  5.1  12  16 
USA  323.8  375.0  4.2  3.0  17  21 
Japan  103.5  171.1  14.0  10.6  9  15 
..  Source: Comm1ss1on serv1ces, DG III based on: 
- Deutsches Institut flir Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin 
Evaluation ofgrossflxed capital stock, Nov. 79 
-US Department of Commerce- Survey of  cu"ent business,  Feb. 81 
- Economic Planning Agency Tokyo 
Private corporate capital stock, March 81. 
1 Data not available for Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland and Greece. 
2 Order of  magnitude, rounded to nearest 1000 ECU per person employed. 
The calculation of the level of capital stock is at best very approximate because of the as-
sumptions which have to be made about amortization rates, and some differences which 
arise purely from different economic structures. 1 On the other hand, the comparison of the 
rate of  growth of  capital stock is probably a more reliable indicator. The estimates of  capital 
1  For example, a small country with a large steel or refining industry will tend to have a high capital stock per em-
ployee. 
54 stock per employed person are also of interest as an indication of the capital intensity of 
manufacturing industry. 
The most striking indication from these data is the very rapid growth in the capital stock in 
Japan. This, combined with the high rate of return to assets employed in Japanese industry, 
combines in providing the basis for the substantial growth in Japanese productivity and 
output. 
On the other hand, the data suggest that capital employed per employee in American in-
dustry has been stagnating since the mid-1970s, and that an analogous situation prevails in 
most of the Member States. 
The low level and slow increase in the United Kingdom is particularly preoccupying for a 
substantially industrialized country. 
This information is available for the USA and Japan up to 1979, but 197  5 is the most recent 
year for which the data are available for all the large Member States. The partial data avail-
able for more recent years suggest that the rate of growth of manufacturing capital stock 
slowed down considerably after 197  5 in the Community and in Japan. 
An indicator of the efficiency with which the capital stock is being used is the partial meas-
ure of productivity of capital, defined as the ratio of value added to the amount of capital 
stock employed. The results of  calculations related to this indicator are summarized below. 
Table23 
Capital procladivity of the manufacturing industry 
(Value added/gross capital stock- 1975 prices) 
1965  1970  1975  1976  1977 
FR of Germany  60.2  56.9"  45.7  47.0  : 
France  40.4  45.9  43.1  44.3  44.3 
Italy  36.3  46.5  40.5  : 
The Netherlands  40.3  37.9  32.0  33.0  33.2 
Belgium  37.7  37.6  34.0  35.5  : 
United Kingdom  45.7  42.5  37.2  37.7  37.1 
Community
1  46.9  48.1  41.4 
USA  84.4  76.2  69.9  74.1  76.4 
Japan  54.6  61.6  47.5  51.5  52.8 
Source: See Table 22. 
1 Not including Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg and Greece. 
2.  International investment flows 
1978  1979 
: 
43.8 
: 
36.7 
77.0  76.0 
54.7  56.9 
The level and characteristics of investment are affected by the size and direction of interna-
tional investment flows. However, there is no direct and simple relationship between inter-
national investment and competitiveness. Although there is obviously some link between 
the international location decisions of multinational companies and their expectations as to 
the competitiveness of their new investments, many other factors come into play such as 
55 the location of existing plant, governments' incentive policies and the socio-economic cli-
mate in the country concerned. Suffice therefore to illustrate in Table 24 the relative im-
portance of  international investment flows and from the Community, Japan and the USA. 
In economic terms such flows mean an increase or decrease in financial resources available 
domestically, and can lead to an intensification of competition on domestic and interna-
tional markets. 
)'able 24 
International investment flows as  O'fe  of GDP 
EC9 
USA 
Japan 
EC9 
USA 
Japan 
Source: Commission services, DG II. 
1 1978. 
1970 
0.58 
0.15 
0.05 
0.54 
0.74 
0.17 
1975  1979 
Inward direct investment 
0.48  0.45
1 
0.17  0.33 
0.04  0.03 
Outward direct investment 
0.55 
0.94 
0.35 
0.66
1 
1.05 
0.27 
1980 
0.42 
0.03 
0.72 
-0.12 
Assessing the role of international investment is further complicated by the fact that the 
data for the Community do not distinguish adequately the level of  international investment 
in manufacturing industry, nor do they separate domestic flows between Member States 
from international flows. 
3.  Technology and innovation 
Changes in the quantity of factors of  production and their relative proportions employed in 
the economy will determine the growth and productivity of the economic system in the 
short  run,  but from  the  point of view  of the  competitiveness  of modern  industrial 
economies, changes in the quality of the factors of production are more important in the 
medium term. 
Thus it is  the level of knowledge applied in the economy both through technology em-
bodied in equipment, and through the individual and collective skills of working people, 
which is  becoming increasingly determinant. 
Improvements in  the level of industrial technology manifest themselves in three main 
ways: firstly, in the introduction of new products or improvements in existing products; 
secondly, improvements in the production process; and thirdly, improvements in the hu-
man organization of the production process.  The overall process of introducing these 
changes in a commercially successful way has come to be known as innovation. 1 
1  See also 'Innovation et politiques economiques' in Reflets et  perspectives de Ia vie economique, 1981, for a dis-
cussion of the relationship between innovation and industrial development. 
56 This crucial process of innovation is  very complex in a mature industrial society. The 
Commission has recently undertaken a thorough analysis of the relationship between in-
novation and public policies with a view to providing the basis for encouraging- andre-
moving obstacles - to innovation in the future. 1 
There is little evidence that the shortcomings of  Community industry's comparative advan-
tage for high technology products 2 result from a deficiency in fundamental research. Al-
though Europe has lost its lead in this area to the USA since World War II, total R&D ex-
penditure in the Community is still twice as high as in Japan, even though this expenditure 
fell as a proportion of GDP during the 1970s. A considerable amount of R&D in the USA 
and the Community is spent on space and defence so that its effects on commercial life are 
haphazard. If  one considers only economically-oriented R&D in terms of share of GDP, 
the approximate figures are 1. 7 % in the USA and EC and 2 %in Japan. Contrary to trends 
in the USA and EC, the Japanese share is rising. 
Table 25 
Government financed R&D in the Community as %  of GOP 
D  F  I  NL  8  UK  IRL  DK  EC 
1970  0.96  1.23  0.46  0.93  0.77  1.24  0.34  0.55  0.98 
1975  1.23  1.1'7  0.36  0.96  0.73  1.27  0.44  0.58  1.04 
1980  1.14  1.13  0.47  0.97  0.62  1.11  0.49  0.45  0.98 
Source: Eurostat. 
Examination of these trends shows that a high level of R&D expenditure on its own does 
not necessarily lead to a faster growth of welfare in a country nor greater performance on 
world markets. The explanation would appear to lie in a more complex mosaic of  economic 
and social factors, including production and quality control, marketing and design. 
4.  Energy as a factor of production 
The central importance of energy for the economic health of the Community is  not in 
doubt, and the Commission has argued that policies 3  to accelerate the process of adjust-
ment to high oil prices, and to reduce dependence on imported oil, are an essential condi-
tion for economic recovery. At this point, however, policymakers encounter a dilemma. 
On the one hand, there is mounting recognition that the price mechanism is an essential 
component of policies for structural change. On the other hand, policy proposals that seek 
to accelerate structural change via the price mechanism, for example by increasing taxes on 
oil, encounter vigorous objections from industry that government is seeking to exacerbate 
its crisis of competitiveness by deliberately placing it at a disadvantage in relation to indus-
try elsewhere.  ' 
1  'Innovation- Development of action', DG XIII- SEC(81) 1859, 24.11.1981. 
2  See Section II. B. on Industrial specialization, above. 
3  'Energy and economic policy' (  COM(81  )5 83) and in 'The development of an energy strategy for the Communi-
ty' (COM(81)540). 
57 This part of the report therefore focuses on the impact of the energy situation on the com-
petitive performance of industry. Energy is viewed here as a factor of production, and the 
questions which arise are: how important a contribution does energy make to overall costs? 
What will be the cost of energy to industry in Europe compared to competitor countries? 
How great is  the scope for substitution of labour and capital for energy? 
(a)  The contribution of  energy to overall costs 
There has been a marked variation in the price increases experienced in different energy 
sectors. Table 26 gives an indication of the real increase in prices in the four main energy 
sectors for four Member States. 
Table 26 
1980 index of real increase in prices 
(1973  = 100) 
FR of  Germany  France  Italy  United 
Kingdom 
Coal  (200)  (200)  (200)  (200) 
Oil  288  385  338  238 
Gas  159-222  209-290  295-311  136-179 
Electricity  113  123  158  110 
..  Source: 'Energy pncmg- Poltcy and transparency' COM(81)539. 
These figures, which are representative of those for other Member States, suggest in broad 
terms that in the period 1970-80 prices of industrial oil have risen by a factor of three or 
four, those for coal and gas have doubled, while electricity prices have risen only slightly in 
real terms. 
In 1970, energy costs accounted for more than 10 %of  total direct and indirect costs in only 
six sectors of which one (transport services) is subject to international competition in a 
strictly limited sense. In the other five sectors, oil products account for a significant share of 
total costs, but in none of them is oil dominant. 
Paper 
Building materials 
Chemicals 
Steel 
Non-ferrous metals 
Table27 
Energy intensive Industries 
Source: Commission services, DG XVII, based on 1970 input-output coefficients. 
Estimated energy content 
oftotal cost 1980 
15.05 
23.07 
15.02 
22.43 
16.50 
(%) 
Energy costs have risen to over 10 % of  total costs in the course of  the 1970s in eight sectors 
of which one, water supply, is not subject to international competition, and another, con-
struction, is  subject to competition only in a limited sense. 
58 Textiles 
Rubber and plastics 
Construction 
Minerals 
Engineering 
Automobiles 
Other transport construction 
Source: See Table 27. 
Table28 
Moderate energy consuming secton 
Estimated energy content 
of  total cost 1980 
12.22 
12.73 
11.07 
12.54 
11.78 
10.59 
11.11 
(%) 
The general conclusion is that even in energy intensive sectors, energy represents a rela-
tively modest proportion of total costs; any disadvantages suffered through high and rising 
energy costs in Europe are in general no greater than companies should be able to absorb 
through increases in productivity. 
However, there are individual processes within sectors that are immensely energy intensive 
and where energy costs are of  critical importance to the cost of the process as a whole. Par-
ticular mention should be made of aluminium smelting where electricity accounts for be-
tween half and three-quarters of direct costs; the same is true of certain bulk chemicals, 
especially alkalis; in the construction sector certain ceramic materials are very energy in-
tensive, and cement manufacture involves an energy content of around 50 %of  total direct 
costs. 
(b)  Energy prices 
Changes in energy prices are of equal importance to their absolute level in any analysis of 
the impact of energy on the competitive position of the economy. Unfortunately, here too 
it is impossible to draw any meaningful comparison between the situation in the individual 
industrialized countries for want of harmonized statistics covering them all. 
Table 29 below lists the 1980 indices for the nominal energy prices and for the actual prices 
for  all  three  consumer  sectors,  i.e.  industry,  transport  and  the  domestic  sector 
Table 29 
Energy price Indices In 1980 . 
Current prices  Constant 1973 prices 
Industry  I  Transport  !Domestic sect  Industry  I  Transport  !Domestic sect 
FR of Germany  187  161  186  135  117  135 
France  303  282  271  142  138  132 
Italy  639  375  433  210  123  140 
The Netherlands  290  194  266  178  119  163 
Belgium  248  214  206  149  129  123 
United Kingdom  374  330  268  127  112  96 
Source: Eurostat. 
59 (1973 = 100). The OECD indices for Japan and the United States have also been added. 
However, they cannot be compared directly with those for the Community. 
Very broadly speaking, the real after-tax prices for energy have moved as follows: 
(i)  In every country, the prices of the energy products for individual consumption have 
risen faster than the prices in the other sectors. 
(ii)  In most cases, the prices of the products for consumption by domestic households, or 
by the residential and tertiary sector, have seen average increases. 
(iii)  In many countries, the increase in energy prices to the transport sector has been rela-
tively modest because of the special tax concessions for motor fuel. 
(iv)  Finally, although there have been appreciable increases in the real prices after tax, the 
average annual increase remained between 6 % and 7 % between 1973 and 1980, 
which is still not enough to impose any great constraints on most sectors of industry, 
where energy still accounts for less than 7 % of the production costs. 
OECD data on energy prices show comparable trends for the USA and Japan up to 1980 
when the series  was  discontinued because it contained serious methodological flaws. 
Throughout the 1980s oil and gas prices in Canada and the USA were controlled at levels 
well below those prevailing elsewhere. But oil prices in the USA were decontrolled in 1981 
and have moved sharply up to world levels. Gas prices are to be decontrolled in 1985. 
Canada is  the only OECD country which now holds both oil and gas prices below world 
levels. 
Japan and the newly industrializing countries are (with the exception of Indonesia) gener-
ally rather more dependent on imported oil than the Community. Energy prices in Japan 
are in general comparable to those prevailing in the Community. 
(c)  Energy and competitiveness 
On the strength of  the above analysis one would not expect energy to have exercised an im-
portant influence on the Community's market share, except in the energy intensive sectors. 
In these sectors one would expect to observe a relatively strong performance on the part of 
the United States and a relatively weak one on the part of Japan. 
The changes in market shares shown in Table 5 (page 25) suggest that in most energy in-
tensive sectors, 1  cheap oil may have given US industry an advantage in the short term. 
However, iron and steel present a striking contrast. Two further qualifications need to be 
made in this context: 
(i)  The energy factor is evidently far from decisive, since Japan increased its market share 
in each energy intensive sector. 
In particular, it is characteristic of most energy intensive products that they are bulky 
and costly to transport-often more so than energy. It  is striking that industries which 
are very dependent on coal, especially steel and cement, have shown no tendency so 
far to relocate close to the American, Australian and South African coalfields. 
1  The following five sectors account for the bulk of energy used in manufacturing industry: non-metallic mineral 
products, unworked metals, iron and steel, basic chemicals, paper. 
60 (ii)  In so far as evidence does exist that low energy prices have enabled the United States 
to expand or retain its market share in energy intensive markets, this has not necessar-
ily assisted the competitive position of the United States in the long term. The US ad-
vantage in oil prices has now been largely eliminated, and in gas prices is likely to 
come to an end in the medium term. The US long-run advantage in coal seems to have 
been less significant than the short-run advantage in oil and gas. It is therefore prob-
able that the American artificial advantage in oil and gas prices has had the effect of 
discouraging specialization in sectors where the USA has genuine long-run compara-
tive advantage. 
The general issue of adaptation to higher energy prices is a complex one. There are marked 
variations in the level of energy efficiency between investment, growth and energy efficien-
cy.  Energy consumption per unit of GDP tends to rise sharply while a country is going 
through the process of industrialization, but to fall in wealthy countries when they begin to 
specialize in high technology services. The scope for energy saving, even in energy inten-
sive industries is very large; the optimum savings can usually be achieved only by a radical 
change in process, often using a different fuel. It follows that, other things being equal, 
countries with high levels of  investment in manufacturing industry and a rapid turnover of 
the capital stock will best adapt to changes in energy prices.
1 
The preliminary conclusion  is,  however,  that despite the Community's unfavourable 
energy situation, energy costs will not for most sectors be a major factor in the performance 
of manufacturing industry over the next 10 to 20 years. 
One important qualification must however be made with respect to the chemical industry. 
OPEC countries have adopted an industrial strategy based on their access to cheap hydro-
carbons, and it is estimated that they have under construction plant for the manufacture of 
basic chemicals equal to 15-20% of the installed capacity of the industry within the Com-
munity. There can be no doubt that the OPEC countries will succeed in selling their pro-
ducts in our markets, both by reducing the producer rent taken on oil and gas, and by link-
ing the supply of crude to political obligations to accept their product, in spite of the fact 
that the economics of location remote from markets in consuming countries may not be 
particularly favourable. 
5.  The influence of human capital on competitiveness 
The changing pattern of employment in recent decades, and in particular the shift towards 
the service sector, has increased the importance of human capital as a determinant of com-
petitiveness in developed countries. In these countries the growth of  the economy is limited 
as much by the rate of development of human as of physical capital (a good example is the 
current shortage of  people able to develop computer software). The growing sophistication 
and technical composition of the production process has increased the demand for skilled 
labour at all levels, and automation of many repetitive tasks is likely to further reduce the 
demand for unskilled labour in the future. In addition, the speed of technical change and 
1  These issues are explored in more detail in the Commission's communication to the Council 'Investment in the 
national use of energy', COM(82)24. 
61 the rapid internationalization of new products and processes, both by making certain skills 
redundant and by creating a constant demand for new skills, has made the existence and 
quality of a comprehensive vocational education system an important input to the indus-
trial system. 
However, any assessment of human capital must include a number of variables which are 
not readily quantifiable. Apart from directly relevant effects, such as on productivity levels, 
the composition of the labour force has  a less well defined impact on competitiveness 
through social attitudes to work, acceptance of change, etc. which are important to com-
petitiveness in the longer term. 
In many respects the Community, Japan and the USA have similar human capital endow-
ments-an educated work force, rising levels of female participation, low levels of popula-
tion growth, broadly similar employment structures, etc. However, a closer look reveals 
differences in trends and orientation which will in the longer term influence competitive-
ness levels. 
(a)  Population 
The demographic situation of each of the three groups under consideration will evolve dif-
ferently in the medium term. The total population of all three groups will increase up to 
1990 with the smallest increase being in the Community (EC 1 %, Japan 6 %, USA 10 %  ). 
The populations of Japan and the Community are ageing more rapidly than that of the 
USA. By 1990 it is expected that 43% of the EC and Japanese populations will be aged 15 
to 44 whereas in the USA the figure is projected as 46% and the projections for those aged 
over 65 are 15% for the European Community, 12% for the USA, 11% for Japan. 
(b)  Education 
As a result of both population trends and of the tight labour market situation, demand for 
education in general and vocational education and further training in particular increased 
during the 1970s. 
The USA has a relatively high proportion of  the population in the educational system while 
Japanese and European levels are considerably lower and more directly comparable. In 
most countries there has been a rapid increase in the number of third-level students and a 
steady increase in the number of first and second-level pupils. 
Table 30 
The proportion of students taldag subjects of direct relevance to Industry 
(1976- ") 
EC  Japan  USA 
Commerce, business 
administration  5.6  - 11.0 
Natural sciences  8.1  1.8  5.2 
Maths, computer science  1.6  0.6  1.5 
Engineering  10.9  17.8  3.7 
Source: Unesco Yearbook. 
62 There are considerable differences in emphasis in the higher education systems of the 
countries in question with the highest proportion of students following courses in medical 
sciences in the Community, in social sciences in Japan while in the USA there is a wider 
spread across the range of studies. Enrolment of 19-24 year olds in third-level education 
averaged 24% in the Community, 32.5% in Japan and rose to 56% in the USA. 
From Table 30 it can be seen that the position varies widely: there is an orientation towards 
business studies in  the USA, towards engineering Japan and in the Community a less-
marked trend in favour of engineering and natural sciences. 
Trends in female education were comparable in all three groups with the vast majority of 
women studying the humanities or in teacher training. In the Community, women make up 
around 42% of the third-level students ranging from 34% in the Netherlands to 46.9% in 
France. In Japan female participation is only 20.4% while in the USA it is 47.9 %. 
(c)  Vocational training 
In both the Community and the USA the vocational training system is a mixture of off-
the-job programmes run by State and local authorities and private company training 
whereas in Japan most vocational training is  done in the company, on the job. 
In the Community in 197  8, 24 %of 16-17 and 41 %of 17-18 year olds left school and pur-
sued no further education or training. In both the USA and the Community unemployment 
is highest among the unskilled/semi-skilled as these are the jobs most likely to come under 
pressure from automation, imports and from low-cost countries. However, the majority 
are undergoing full-time education or training and some (15% of 16-17 and 18% of 
17-18 year olds) are involved in part-time training. 
In the Community, the level of vocational training within the school system is quite low. 
The level of further training is very low indeed in all Member States, indicating that there is 
little recourse to formal ongoing training or retraining once a person enters the labour force 
full-time. In all only between 2.5 to 10% take courses to improve training already acquired 
or to receive new training. The apparently low level of further training is especially worry-
ing in view of the current speed and extent of technological change because it implies the 
likely outdating of  skills and an undesirable degree of rigidity. However, the official statis-
tics do not take account of in-company training of older workers which may be significant 
in some companies and in some sectors. 
In 1978 over 17 million Americans (the labour force numbers 102 million) were engaged 
on federally-aided vocational programmes,  3.3  million  in  office  occupations  and 3.4 
million in trade and industrial training. As in the Community the main training effort is 
concentrated on the under-25s but, unlike in the Community, almost 40% of those enrol-
led on vocational courses in 1976 were over 35 indicating a greater degree of retraining and 
updating of skills. 
(d)  The labour force 
The civilian working population is of roughly similar size in the Community ( 109 million in 
1979) and in the USA (102 million in 1979) and almost double that of  Japan (56 million in 
63 1979). Structural changes in the labour force result from changes in the total population of 
working age (15-65) and participation rates within the relevant age groups. The active 
population is forecast to rise in most Member States until at least 1990 and is expected to 
stabilize thereafter. A similar situation is forecast for the USA and Japan, but the active 
population of the USA will grow at a faster rate over the period, overtaking that of the EC 
around the turn of the century. 
Throughout most of the 1980s the labour market will be under heavy pressure to provide 
jobs both for large numbers of young people entering the labour market for the first time 
(the consequence of high birth rates in the 1960s) and increasing numbers of  women seek-
ing employment. 
(e)  Labour force specialization 
The proportion of  professional, technical and related workers is roughly similar in the USA 
and the Community but significantly lower in Japan. By contrast, the share of administra-
tive and managerial staffin the USA at 10.2% is considerably higher than in either Japan 
(4.1 %) or the Community (Federal Republic of Germany 3.1 %, France 3.2 %) even al-
lowing for the different time periods used. Another difference lies in the number of sales 
workers, highest in Japan (12.6 %) and lowest in the USA (6.1 %). Over a 15-20 year 
period all countries showed similar developments-an increase in the number of technical, 
professional and clerical workers, a decline in agricultural and production workers. In most 
countries the number of administrative,  managerial and sales workers increased only 
slightly while in France and the USA the share of sales workers actually declined. Thus the 
shift to the white-collar service sector has occurred in all these countries bringing with it a 
requirement for higher levels of training and education. 
The occupational structure of Japan shows considerable differences from that of the Com-
munity and the USA-the evolution is in the same direction but is taking place later. In par-
ticular, the high number of agricultural and sales workers is out of step with the pattern in 
other developed countries and reflects the fact that the attention paid to industrial de-
velopment has not been equally extended to other sectors of the economy. 
It is  also interesting to focus  more narrowly on a particular skill category, e.g. on the 
number of scientists and engineers in the labour force, professions which are currently re-
ceiving much attention in view of the important role of R&D and technical know-how in 
our present-day society. 
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Table 31 
Scientists and engineers per 10 000 In the labonr force, 1965-77 
1965 
France  21.0 
FR of  Germany  22.6 
United Kingdom  21.4 
Japan  24.6 
USA  64.1 
Source: US National Science Board, SCience mdicators 1978. 
1 1976. 
2 Data not available. 
1968  1972  1975 
26.4  28.1  29.3 
25.9  35.7  39.4 
17.2  27.8  30.6 
31.1  38.1  47.9 
66.9  58.3  56.4 
1977 
29.91 
40.5 
2 
49.9 
57.4 The USA remains the clear leader although the gap between it and the other countries has 
narrowed significantly since 1965 and within the USA the situation has fluctuated around a 
declining trend from the high point of 1968. Japan has doubled its share of engineers and 
scientists per 10 000 of the labour force in 12 years, as one would expect from the emphasis 
on engineering in third-level education. Of the three EC countries mentioned the Federal 
Republic of Germany has made the most progress, starting from a position roughly similar 
to that of France and the United Kingdom in 1965 but growing at a much faster rate. How-
ever, the gap between the Community and its other industrialized competitors remains 
considerable and unless there is a marked change in the preferences of third-level students 
the Community is likely to continue at a disadvantage in terms of high technology and its 
application. 
(f)  Labour force productivity 
The link between investment, technology and human capital and the overall productivity of 
the labour force cannot be established directly. Table 11 summarizes the rate of growth of 
hourly productivity in real terms since 1960 in the Community and in the USA and Japan. 
The data-which are discussed in greater detail in Chapter III. A-confirm the sustained 
growth in Japanese productivity, low and declining productivity growth in the USA and the 
wide range of situations in the Community. 
Concerning manufacturing industry, a recent OECD study 1 found that one of the main 
reasons for the decline in US productivity was the inadequate rhythm of investment which 
also had some influence by the closing of the technological gap with the USA and by inter-
sectoral transfers. By contrast, the rigidity of the labour market and varying managerial 
capabilities are put forward to explain the declining growth of productivity in the United 
Kingdom. 
Table 32 
Apparent labour produdivity1 In 111811Dfacturbaa industry 
1965 
USA  86.0 
Japan  40.9 
Belgium  55.7 
Denmark  -
France  -
FR. of  Germany  68.5 
Italy  -
The Netherlands  -
United Kingdom  75.2 
Source: OECD. 
1 Value-added in manufacturing at constant prices 
Number of  persons employed. 
1  OECD CPE.WP2 (79)8, and DSTI/IND/81.40. 
1970  1975  1978 
89.1  100  110.3 
73.3  100  140.1 
78.8  100  124.3 
79.0  100  -
84.4  100  117.6 
86.8  100  112.8 
94.3  100  117.9 
76.0  100  120.4 
88.1  100  107.4 
(1975- 100) 
1979 
111.1 
149.5 
132.5 
-
123.7 
117.8 
-
-
-
65 Table 32 shows the evolution of apparent labour productivity in manufacturing industry 
since 197  5. The increase in the Japanese rate is particularly striking. Productivity increases 
in a number of Community countries outstripped those of the USA during the decade. 
C.  Sectoral performance 
The performance of a number of  industrial sectors has been examined with a view to iden-
tifying some of the key factors which may have accounted for their comparative strengths 
and weaknesses. The sectors concerned are motor vehicles, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, 
iron and steel, clothing, pulp, paper and board, aerospace, shipbuilding and machine tools. 
This analysis attempts to relate the observed experience in individual sectors to the broader 
factors described in the preceding sections of this report. 
These sectors make up a representative cross-section of EC industry. They include sectors 
which are characterized, amongst other features: 
(i)  by high, medium and low technology; 
(ii)  small and medium-sized enterprises, giant multinationals; 
(iii)  growth or decline; 
(iv)  capital-intensity or labour-intensity; 
(v)  considerable export potential or limited export potential. 
The examination of their performance suggests that amongst the many factors which have 
influenced their competitive performance the following would appear to be of particular 
importance: 
Degree of  specialization 
The relative success of the Community aerospace and the paper/paperboard sectors would 
appear to stem from a concentration on specialized products, e. g. Airbus and civil helicop-
ters in the former case; special grades of paper in the latter case. The poor performance of 
the steel sector may be partially due to its relative lack of specialization. 
Commitment to research and development (R&D) 
The aerospace, the chemical and, in particular, the pharmaceutical sectors have committed 
significant resources to R&D. On the other hand, R&D has had a very limited impact in 
shipbuilding, clothing and machine tools. 
Capacity utilization 
Under-utilization of capacity has had adverse effects on the profitability of enterprises 
operating in a number of sectors. Synthetic fibres, steel and shipbuilding have been af-
fected particularly badly in recent years. In addition to the direct financial consequences 
66 for the enterprises it has also severely limited their possibilities for investing in R & D and in 
new capital equipment. 
Product range,  design and quality 
The clothing sector, which is characterized by low-skilled labour-intensive production, has 
been able to compete successfully in fashion products which require a high degree of  design 
creativity. Although the EC motor vehicles sector has a good range of products in terms of 
both type and quality a rationalization of  the product range would almost certainly result in 
greater economies of scale. Unlike its Japanese counterpart, which concentrates on rela-
tively long production runs for standardized products, the EC machine-tool sector tends to 
produce to the specific designs of the consumer-a larger output of a more standard range 
of product should contribute to a more competitive performance. 
Intra-Community cooperation 
An increasing degree of  intra-Community cooperation between enterprises exists in some 
sectors, e. g. aerospace and motor cars. In others little or none exists, e. g. shipbuilding. It 
may be no coincidence that some of the sectors which have performed better than average 
and which require high output levels to survive have cooperated at Community or Euro-
pean level to produce trans-European products, e.g. Airbus, 'European' or 'world' cars. 
Sectoral structures 
The optimum size of an enterprise will vary from sector to sector and within a sector de-
pending on many factors, including, amongst others, the scale of the markets in which it is 
operating, the production technology,  the role of R&D. A  number of the sectors ex-
amined, e. g.  aerospace and clothing, are characterized by many enterprises which are 
probably too small or otherwise ill-equipped to invest on a sufficient scale (in production, 
marketing, R&D) to be able to exploit the opportunities offered by markets which have 
shifted from a national to a continental or, even, world dimension (and, equally important, 
to be able to defend their existing markets against competitors who are operating on the 
appropriate scale). 
Sectors which have traditionally operated on a relatively large scale at the national level 
and which have also in a number of  cases operated at the multinational level, e. g. the motor 
vehicles sector, have recognized the need to reorganize production on the basis of multi-
plant specialization if they are to compete successfully. This is clearly demonstrated by the 
growth of the European Community's share in the OECD's imports of motor vehicle 
bodies, engines and parts. 
Intra-Community barriers to  trade 
Obstacles to the free movement of their products appear to be a factor reducing the ability 
of the pharmaceutical and the electrical and mechanical engineering sectors to exploit fully 
possible production economies of scale. 
Given the restricted size of the domestic markets of EC enterprises, the difficulty for non-
national enterprises of obtaining public purchasing contracts in other countries has had a 
similar effect within the aerospace sector. 
67 Exchange-rate fluctuations 
Both the aerospace and the shipbuilding sectors appear to be particularly susceptible to ex-
change-rate fluctuations of the US dollar. In the case of  shipbuilding the relative exchange 
rates between EC currencies and the US dollar and the Japanese yen are of critical impor-
tance. 
Whilst, as can be seen from the above, all sectors possess some strengths and, usually, many 
more weaknesses, the mix varies from sector to sector. The more successful sectors would 
appear to  have  certain common characteristics,  e. g.  market,  rather than production, 
oriented products; an appropriate degree of specialization; structures adapted to the scale 
of the markets in which the enterprise is operating. Given the base provided by the sizeable 
output of most of the EC sectors examined, the scope for considerable improvements in 
competitiveness exists. 
D.  Corporate structure and performance 
1.  The importance of the firm 
The macroeconomic approach developed in the previous chapter gives a picture of the 
competitiveness of European industry, in which efficient resource allocation and manage-
ment, together with natural endowments, play a central role. A second way of looking at 
the question is  therefore to see what we know about how resources are used within the 
firms themselves. 
Since investment and productivity appear to be the focal point of weakness in the supply 
side of our economies, there is a need to enlarge the analysis in the microeconomic direc-
tion, focusing on the behaviour of the basic unit in industry, the manufacturing enterprise. 
Economic performance, financial structures and corporate management of manufacturing 
enterprises must be taken into account in any evaluation of competitiveness, as the com-
pany is both the point at which production-oriented resources are combined and the sub-
ject of competition at world level. 
2.  A microeconomic approach 
In order to appreciate efficiency in resource allocation and management we have brought 
together the evidence provided by different sources such as national statistics, company ac-
counts and business organizations. 
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National accounts cover the manufacturing sector as a whole and are broken down by 
sector: in principle they are the most comprehensive source allowing international com-
parisons of economic results of manufacturing activities as  represented by operating 
surpluses, notably when they are harmonized. - Company accounts give different kinds of information; profits usually include not only 
the operating surplus but also gains from stock appreciation. 
Company accounts and their indications on profits and financial structures are not sub-
ject to general systematic aggregation on a harmonized basis: this is one only for limited 
samples (especially when international comparison is  involved)  usually covering the 
larger corporations. Different accounting methods and tax conventions also bias some of 
the data and this is difficult to correct at the present stage of work in this field. It  remains 
nevertheless true that these differences are in principle due to national realities which re-
flect and influence respective competitive performances, as this information is increas-
ingly supplied by specialized sources and is apparently used by the business community. 
Information about company organization and structure is based on business manage-
ment concepts which are usually qualitative and descriptive. Although the appraisal of 
this factor is on a different basis from the previous ones, it is based on widely applied 
methods, which provide useful insights into the ways in which companies function. 
Emphasis has been placed on large enterprises because of data availability and because 
they are on the front line of  international competition. Although smaller companies play 
an important role, bigger companies are vital: 
(i)  the performance of  big companies determines to a great extent the overall competi-
tiveness of the European economy. In particular, they account for a large propor-
tion of international trade in manufactures, much of which takes the form of intra-
firm transactions; 
(ii)  because the complex and turbulent market environment requires organizations 
which can act as stabilizers and can internalize structural change; 
(iii)  our main competitors have already made their choice in this direction. Unless it is 
able to adapt its own strategies, European industry will be forced to adjust to those 
of other large enterprises. 
Problems of coverage, comparability and exclusions limit our conclusions at this stage to: 
(i)  drawing attention to this field of microeconomic analysis, which does not seem to have 
been sufficiently developed and debated in the Community, but which could be rel-
evant in terms of industrial adjustment; and 
(ii)  suggesting a number of questions which are in line with, and provide consistent in-
terpretation of, other indications that the competitiveness of European industry is de-
clining. 
3.  Economic performance of the manufacturing sector 
For the purposes of this analysis, performance is measured by the operating surplus, which 
is the surplus arising from productive activities once inputs of materials and labour have 
been paid for, and before paying direct taxes and financial charges. When related to the 
stock of fixed assets employed in production, irrespective of their financing, it gives the 
concept or return on productive capital. 
69 Graph 5: 
Gross rate of return on capital stock in maaafactmtDa 
39 
35,1 
31,2 
27,3 
23,4 
19,5 
15,6 
11,7 
7,8 
3,9 
Canada 
USA 
--- Jru>an  · 
-·-·  FR. of  Germany 
-•  United Kingdom 
.. ···············.USA 
••• ./  ..,,. FR of  Germany 
-~  _..,·-:-·-·  Canada 
United 
Kingdom 
1955  1956  1957  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979 
Source: OECD- Special meeting on national accounts, Paris, 9-12 June 1981, Room document No 1. 
Return on capital in manufacturing has been declining in the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the United Kingdom since 1955, according to OECD data, 1 while the downward trend 
was less pronounced in the USA and Japan, both of which recorded better results. 
A study currently being undertaken in the Commission analyses the ratio of net operating 
profit on the aggregate working plus fixed capital employed in manufacturing industry. 
Preliminary results provide evidence of declining rates of return from 1960 to 1979 in the 
four large Member States. 
Further evidence is provided by performance appreciation based on the share of  operating 
profit in value added. Where comparison is possible, profit shares decreased in Community 
countries less than the rate of profit on capital employed declined. The US experience was 
similar but the opposite was recorded in Japan, where  rat~s of return on capital were main-
tained through improved capital productivity, even with decreasing shares of value added 
going to profits. 
Performance appreciation based on a microeconomic notion of  operating surplus therefore 
highlights certain weaknesses in the economic efficiency of manufacturing operations: 
1  OECD data based on national accounts. Rates of return based on gross measures have the principal advantage 
of by-passing  the whole  problem of calculating  capital  consumption for  both profits  and capital  stock. 
Moreover, it  turns out that gross and net OECD data are quite in line. Capital stock is calculated by cumulation 
of investment following the perpetual inventory method. 
70 (i)  within the Community, when compared with other economic activities and between 
Member States; 
(ii)  vis-a-vis international competition, when compared with our main industrial com-
petitors, notably Japan. 
Where data are available, the indications are that the problem for EC industry lies more in 
its capacity to generate a surplus rather than in its allocation. 
Along the same lines, a recent analysis undertaken for the Commission 1 based, amongst 
other indicators, on profit shares, concluded that an essential point often neglected, besides 
the need for tight control of production costs, is  the increase in value added generated 
either in volume or in price, by moving to higher value-added products. 
The persistence of such a weakness in the capacity to generate a surplus well beyond the 
short-term cyclical fluctuations, combined with the recent rising cost of capital is likely to: 
(i)  have negative effects on the investment propensity of Community industry and to in-
duce sectoral and geographic shifts of resources; 
(ii)  lead to a vicious circle which undermines the competitive position of EC industry and 
its capacity to adjust endogenously to present and foreseeable challenges. 
Indeed, weak levels and trends of operating profit in manufacturing have since 1973 been 
accompanied by a deterioration of other major economic indicators such as value added, 
gross capital formation and employment. 
4.  Company accounts and financial structures 
If  the economic performance of resources engaged in manufacturing activities in the EC 
has not been satisfactory, neither has that of the main actor in manufacturing, the industrial 
firm. 
Company accounts, though their major shortcomings in periods of rapid inflation are well 
known, are nevertheless the most common reference to evaluate company performance. 
The evidence fits with the results of national accounts: significant samples of  larger corpo-
rations show that the sales margins, return on assets and remuneration of equity capital are 
weaker for Community companies. In 1980, the first hundred industrial groups in Europe 
realized an average net profit on sales of 1.4 % against 2.4 % for the first hundred Japanese 
groups and 4.8 %for the first hundred US groups. The gap is also considerable in terms of 
net profit on own capital: 6.5% for European corporations, 14 o/o for the Japanese, 15.6% 
for the Americans. 2 
If  oil companies are excluded from the sample, European corporations recorded an aggre-
gated loss of 0.1 % on own capital while US and Japanese corporations reached respec-
tively an 11.5% and a 13.8% profit. 
1  B. de Closset, 'Competitivites sectorielles et performances dans l'industrie europeenne', March 1981. 
2  'Le Nouvel Economiste "Special 5000"'- Special issue, December 1981. 
71 There are quite different results among the Member States. The major Italian corporations 
suffered the largest losses, while German companies fared best from this point of view. 
Similar divergences become apparent in other samples of major corporations, which high-
light the better performances of US companies. 
Table33 
Net proftt OD sales or 392 JDDufaduriog eoterprises1 
1970  1973  1977  Number of  companies 
in 1977 sample 
FR of Germany  2.44  1.95  1.77  31 
France  4.49  2.59  1.83  23 
Italy  4.45  0.33  -5.51  7 
United Kingdom  4.37  6.21  3.91  40 
The Netherlands  3.90  4.80  3.60  3 
Belgium  3.97  3.58  0.32  3 
Japan2  4.15  4.10  1.76  103 
USA  4.87  5.93  4.77  182 
Source: MITI Management analysis of  world corporations- Tokyo- Fiscal years 1973-79. 
1 Net post-tax profit on gross sales of  392 major enterprises, including oil companies and major retailers. 
2 Japanese sample has a higher proportion of  smaller enterprises. 
Company financial structures vary considerably between Member States, but there are 
some common features. On average, EC industrial companies rely more on their own funds 
than Japanese firms but much less than American ones, while their liquidity seems to be 
less able to assure the shock-absorber function with the constancy of  Japanese firms, espe-
cially in the case of bigger corporations. 
It  is quite clear that in the presence of weak economic performance, unbalanced financial 
structures, especially in terms of external borrowing, run the risk of amplifying problems 
for EC industry. On the other hand, US industry can rely on stronger financial bases and 
Japanese firms enjoy the positive effects of a long-standing financial discipline, certainly 
favoured by the prevailing lending policies of their financial institutions. 
5.  Market and industry structures 
Market and industry structures have been subjected to profound changes resulting from 
the double pressure of demand changes and industrial adaptation. 
Even in terms of  structures, some indicators point to unsatisfactory evidence for EC indus-
try: 
(i)  as regards direct investment, the increase of outward flows from EC countries since 
the mid-1960s surpassed that of inward flows. Beyond the positive aspects of the in-
creasing outward orientation of EC investment, these trends could also mean a de-
creasing interest both of foreign and domestic investors in the EC; 
(ii)  multinationality of production of EC corporations is weaker than that of the Ameri-
cans and is  much lower if intra-Community production is excluded; 
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National amd international operations in the CommUDity, by industry, 1977-79 
Metal industries 
of  which:  Energy 
Year  Total  Machin- Elec- Metal 
ery  trical  goods1 
and me- engi-
chanical  neer-
parts  ing 
1977  634  - - - 52 
1978  733  - - - 56 
1979  881  232  163  160  88 
1977  27  - - - 2 
1978  32  - - - 2 
1979  30  8  6  6  3 
..  Source: EC Commission - 1980 Competition Report  . 
1 Excluding machinery and transport equipment. 
Services 
Chemi- Tex- Other  Food  of  which: 
cals  tiles  manu- indus- Total  Banking Holding 
fac- try  and  com-
turing  insur- panics 
ance 
Number of  operations 
203  101  379  179  772  243  55 
176  109  380  194  656  182  58 
217  146  629  225  741  234  44 
As% oftotal 
9  5  16  8  33  11  2 
8  5  17  8  28  8  3 
7  5  22  8  25  8  2 
Total 
2320 
2304 
2927 
100 
100 
100 
(iii)  the recently recorded increase in intra-firm cooperation in the Community was due to 
national operations, while international operations stayed constant. 
As the internationalization of production for EC companies seems to be accompanied by 
higher return on sales, delays in this field run the risk of being costly in terms of corporate 
performance. 
The larger size of the firm seems to go together with sales growth of Community com-
panies, but not with the rates of return on sales, which are higher for smaller companies. 
The increase in the size of Community companies recorded from 1962 to 1977 could then 
have led to decreasing overall returns on sales of Community industry. 
Companies of vastly different size and organization evidently operate very successfully in 
the same market and it is in order to approach this question from an agnostic point of view. 
Large firms benefit from economies of scale, privileged access to resources, and specializ-
ation at the plant level and among senior management. On the other hand, they may also 
suffer from inertia, costly overheads, problems of communication and motivation and from 
other quasi-bureaucratic phenomena. 
Small firms benefit from flexibility, the low threshold of rapid growth, good communica-
tion within the firms, and the possibility of product specialization to fit specific niches in the 
market. On the other hand they suffer from inadequate resources, insufficient information 
about the economy and the market (when management is not specialized), low R&D and 
consequently weak technological innovation. 
The dilemma of the large firm is that it has the knowledge and finance to innovate but may 
not have the organizational abilities to do so. The dilemma of  the small firm is that it has the 
flexibility and motivation to innovate; it may not have the resources and the knowledge. 
73 In the past, many large firms have tried to overcome their inherent disadvantages through 
decentralization and by creating autonomous 'profit centres' in their subsidiaries. This ap-
proach is now meeting an opposing trend towards international rationalization of multina-
tional activities which may reduce subsidiaries' autonomy. This process may be a vehicle 
for medium-term gains but may result in less flexible structures in the longer term. On the 
other hand, many small firms have overcome their shortcomings, often with significant 
help from the public authorities, chambers of commerce or the banks. Thus the predomi-
nance of small companies in some parts of the Community is regarded as an advantage. 
74 V.  Company organization and management 
In the company the primary responsibility for performance lies with the management, 
whose function is  to combine productive resources with a view to an economic result. 
While most of the attention is taken by availability and cost of productive factors, a major 
risk lies in the neglect of the basic fact that it is business organization which determines the 
actual employment, cost and performances of these factors. 
There are plenty of examples to show that investment expenditure is not sufficient in itself: 
it can even be damaging, if it is not chosen, implemented and managed properly. 
When analysing manufacturing competitiveness, having moved from the macro to the 
micro dimension, it is then necessary to take into consideration not only the hardware such 
as equipment and machinery but also the software represented by corporate management. 
Indeed, several authors have attributed the leading role in bringing about economic growth 
to business organization. 1 They believe that the organizational response is not only the 
basis for daily operations but also the strategic element in coping with fundamental changes 
in the process of production and markets in modern business, rather than entrepreneurial 
talents, capital markets or public policies. 
Experience proves that important gains, not only in productivity and production costs, but 
also in market identification, commercial dynamism, financial results and technical innova-
tion can be achieved through organizational and management techniques. One example 
will suffice: the US Federal Trade Commission has recently estimated that a 50% increase 
of annual inventory turnover (which has proved to be possible with the adoption of sophis-
ticated inventory control such as the Material Requirement Planning-MRP) from the av-
erage level of 7 in 1980 would increase operating income for the typical US manufacturer 
by about 11 %. 2 Beyond the organization, implementation and control of  specific phases of 
the process, the most difficult task is that of harmonizing and finalizing the entire process-
from the research to the commercial phase - with given objectives. 
It is certain that organization, management and strategies are not natural endowments. 
They can be learned, applied, improved, sold and bought like any other software. This has 
already happened when, for example, the Japanese went to the USA to study American 
management techniques, and happens even more so today, now that Japanese companies 
are selling their specific organizational methods back to other industrialized countries. 
1  See A. H. Cole, 'The entrepreneur- Introductory remarks', American Economic Review,  May 1968; 
T. Cochran, 'The business revolution', American Historical Review,  December 1975. 
2  See C. Bernan, 'A big pay-off from inventory control', Fortune,  July 1981. 
75 An evaluation of the Community situation as  regards industrial management must first 
take into account its development. 
The function of professional salaried management has developed in the Community much 
more slowly than in the USA for several reasons: 
(i)  higher direct involvement of  owners in company management. This may create an am-
biguous relationship between the actual operational responsibility in the company 
and the privilege of ownership and probably contributes to the adversary relation-
s~ips which exist in parts of European industry; 
(ii)  the national fragmentation of  European markets. Professional management has first 
developed and best performed to deal with mass production and mass distribution 
problems on very large homogeneous markets. The higher degree of fragmentation 
and segmentation of European markets has reduced both the interest in adopting new 
mass production techniques and the incentive to integrate production with large pur-
chasing and marketing organizations; 
(iii)  different types of  institutional arrangements for the firm's property.  National differ-
ences such as the industry-wide holding in the United Kingdom, the cartel in the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, the industrial financial holding in France, the industrial 
holding State-ownership in Italy have brought about specific basic modes of  operation 
which did not stimulate transnational interchangeability of management. 
This historical delay is still evident in recent times: by 1970, for example, the divisional 
structure in which a general office is responsible for measuring performance, planning and 
allocating resources, and coordinating and controlling the operating units was adopted by 
54 of the 100 largest companies in France, by 50 in the Federal Republic of Germany and 
by 57 in the United Kingdom, compared with 80 in the USA. 1 
The internationalization of markets now brings different institutional and organizational 
structures into direct confrontation. 
Among managers, different cultural values and social norms, not to mention economic and 
political systems, produce different behaviour and goals. 
An extensive investigation (over 100 000 cases) has highlighted similarities and differences 
in many aspects of management style and methods across national boundaries.  2 
There is evidence of national characterization in the greater preference of American and 
Japanese management for risk-taking together with  considerable concern for product 
quality, two basic assets which contribute to coping efficiently with current competition. 
Historical delays and national characteristics have therefore marked efficiency of EC in-
dustrial  management and imposed constraints on the implementation of appropriate 
strategic policies. 
1  A. D. Chandler jr and H. Daems, 'Managerial hierarchies', Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1980. 
2  B. M. Bass, P. C. Burger,'  Assessment of managers-An international comparison', The Free Press, New York, 
1979. 
76 On the world scene, three approaches seem to be the most effective: 
(i)  overall cost leadership, 
(ii)  product differentiation, 
(iii)  market or product focus. 
Failure to develop a strategy in at least one of these directions leads to a 'stuck-in-the-
middle' position which almost guarantees marginalization. 
In this perspective, the need for dynamism and innovation concerns not only product and 
process, but even more so organization and management styles. It  has, for example, been 
found that the managerial, structural and operating requirements for innovation and cost-
cutting can be mutually antithetical. 1 If  the applied performance measures are those ap-
propriate to a strategy of cost minimization, when strategies stress either innovation or 
quality, manufacturing management linked to productivity and costs is likely to adopt a 
cost minimization attitude, therefore drawing the firm away from its stated purpose. 
This shows once again that industrial efficiency and competitiveness rely to a great extent 
on the way in which people and resources are organized within the firm. 
The orientation of industrial management appears to differ from one firm to another de-
pending on the priority attached to their responsiveness to market signals and to technical 
constraints and opportunities of the productive process. Although it is  not possible to 
generalize from this point of view, it does seem that the major Japanese corporations have 
succeeded in integrating the best of both approaches. They tend to have the most com-
prehensive strategies, encompassing a world market orientation as well as successful or-
ganization of production including the optimum application of high technologies. 
Community companies need to be able to reconcile their own strategies and management 
methods to the long-term needs of the market and to the necessary flexibility and innova-
tiveness in the productive process, because experience shows that there is a clear link be-
tween adaptability and prosperity, even survival. 
1  See amongst others, M. E. Porter, 'Competitive strategy', The Free Press, New York, 1980. 
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81 ANNEX 3 
Methodological and statistical problems 
This note refers to the principal problems encountered in using and interpreting statistics of the kind 
which are used extensively in this report. 
Aggregation problems: The aggregate data for a group of  countries (as in the Community) or a group 
of firms (as in a 'sector') mask the disparities within the group. 
Index number problems: The best way to illustrate trends is often to use an index number. But if the 
composition of the variable changes (as in an export price index), then the validity of the index is 
vitiated. 
Exchange-rate changes and inflation affect international comparisons. Data which are corrected to 
constant prices and exchange rates do not necessarily reflect differences in purchasing power. 
Sampling problems: Some of  the data used in the report are based on statistical samples. In this case 
the results may be much less significant for small samples (for example a few companies in one coun-
try) than they are for the sample as  a whole. 
Furthermore some of  the industrial data exclude small firms, and this to different degrees in different 
countries. 
Accounting conventions: Comparing corporate data is bedevilled by different statistical and account-
ing conventions concerning the classification of  companies' assets, their profitability and the amortiz-
ation of their investments. 
Differences in definition give rise to particular difficulties in relation to the definition of 'sectors' or 
product groups. It  is important to appreciate this because so much industrial information is classified 
by 'sectors', which at first sight appear to be unique and common-sense concepts. 
The concept of an industrial sector is useful in so far as subgroups of industrial activities can be ex-
pected to perform in many respects in a similar way. In practice, it is very difficult to delineate the 
boundaries of individual sectors. The definition of the 'same' sector often varies between different 
countries and especially in this context between Community countries and third countries. The 
Community also has an internationally unique definition of  the iron and steel industry (ECSC) which 
extends to some Community statistics. 
The analysis of the performance of  industrial sectors depends to a considerable degree on the avail-
ability of a sufficient range of accurate and comparable statistical data. However, both the quantity 
and quality of the statistical data which are available are often inadequate. The main weaknesses of 
official industrial statistics concern: 
(i)  the limited availability of disaggregated harmonized data at the international level. Disaggre-
gated and detailed statistics often exist at national level, but then not harmonized and not com-
parable between countries; 
(ii)  the different bases on which statistical data are produced (for example, some data are product 
based, e. g. prices and international trade; some data are establishment or enterprise based, e. g. 
employment and investment).  The conversion from  production value  on nomenclature to 
another can be done but only on a rather aggregated level; 
82 (iii)  the considerable time-lag which usually exists between reference year and the publication of 
much of the structural data. 
Taken overall, these statistical difficulties mean that the quantitative information tends to suggest 
greater homogeneity and stability than is in reality the case. In the Community we know that there are 
vast differences in industrial performance in the same sector in different Member States. These dif-
ferences do not always appear from the statistical data. On the other hand, analysis which tries to take 
account of them tends to become either impressionistic or extraordinarily detailed. 
83 ANNEX4 
Definitions of product groups used to examine shares of OECD1 imports 
(Chapter II A 2) 
SITC rev.  1 
251 
2662 
512 
513 
541 
561 
581 
641 
652 
656 
67 
7114 
7115  + 7326 + 7327  + 7328 
7151 
7321 
7323 
735 
8411  + 8412  + 8413  + 8414 
Product group 
Pulp and waste papers 
Synthetic fibres 
Organic chemicals 
Inorganic chemicals 
Pharmaceutical products 
Manufactured fertilizers 
Plastic materials, regenerated cellulose and resins 
Paper and paperboard 
Woven cotton fabrics 
Made-up articles of textile material 
Iron and steel 
Aircraft engines 
Motor vehicle bodies, engines and parts 
Machine tools for working metals 
Passenger motor-cars 
Lorries and trucks 
Ships and boats 
Clothing and accessories 
1  OECD countries not including Yugoslavia, New Zealand and, for 1980 only, Turkey. 
84 ANNEX 5 
Classification of selected high technology sectors: 
Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) revision 2 for 1980 
(Revision 1 for 1963 and 1970 data) 
SITC 2 
code 
1980 
Description of product sectors 
SITC 1 
code 
1963/70 
523  Other inorganic chemicals; organic and inorganic compounds of precious  514 
metals 
524  Radioactive and associated materials  515 
541  Medicinal and pharmaceutical products  541 
741  Engines and motors, non-electric (reaction, gas turbine, turbo-propellers) 
716  Rotating electric plant 
718-7  Nuclear reactors 
736  Machine tools for working metal 
752  Automatic data-processing machines, incl. peripherals 
761  Television receivers 
763  Gramophones and other sound recorders 
764  Telecommunications equipment 
771  Electric power machinery other than 716 above 
773 
774 
Equipment for distributing electricity 
Electric medical apparatus, incl. radiology 
77  5  Household electric equipment 
776 
781 
782.1 
791.1 
792 
871.0 
872.0 
874 
881.1 
881.2 
Valves, tubes, diodes, transistors, microcircuits 
Passenger motor-cars 
Motor vehicles for transport of goods 
Electric rail locomotives 
Aircraft and equipment parts 
Optical instruments and apparatus 
Medical instruments and appliances 
Measuring, checking, analysing, controlling instruments 
Photographic cameras (other than cine) 
Cinematographic cameras, projectors, incl. sound records 
711-7 
891.11 
723 
726 
729.3 
732.1 
732.3 
731.2 
734 
899.99 
861.3 
861.7 
729.52 
861.9 
861.4 
861.5 
85 SITC 2  SITC 1 
code  Description of product sectors  code 
1980  1963/70 
882.2  Photographic film and paper  862.4 
884.1  Lenses, prisms and other optical elements  861.1 
885  Watches and clocks  864 
This list provides the most comprehensive coverage of high-technology products possible, within the 
limits of SITC revision 2. 
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89 I.  Introduction 
A permanent function of the Community is to make it possible to bring about change when 
it is needed. If  we are going to succeed in this today, we must work out an industrial de-
velopment strategy in articulation with the measures proposed in the fields of energy and 
research. 
For this reason, the Community's role in the development of Europe's industry is a central 
theme in the current discussion on the future of Europe prompted by the May mandate. 
The industrial strategy of the public authorities, like that of the major companies and in-
dustrial complexes, must now be formulated with a complexity, a breadth of scope and a 
time-span which in Europe are feasible only at Community level. The aim must be tore-
create a climate of confidence that will encourage innovative and expansion investment, 
both by the rna jor industrial groupings and by the small and medium-sized businesses, 
whose contribution to the creation of  productive employment is common knowledge. 1 This 
confidence must be shared by governments: as they try to restore balance to public fi-
nances, they must show more practical faith in the growth potential that can be released by 
business's capacity for innovation rather than rely on taxation, which stunts this capacity. 
The strategy must be in line with the preliminary draft fifth medium-term economic policy 
programme. 
The crisis has shown that European industry, faced with the same challenges as its trading 
partners, has found it more difficult to adjust to the changes taking place in the world. In 
particular, the Community's overall industrial performance is not as good as that of the 
USA or Japan. 
The Community's share of world exports in manufactured goods is  declining while the 
USA's share remains steady and Japan's is increasing. Europe is just managing to keep a 
trade surplus, excluding energy products, while the USA and Japan are increasing theirs. 
The major problem facing European industry is  that improvement in productivity has 
slowed down, the reason being inadequate productive investment. As a result, competi-
tiveness in Europe as measured by unit labour costs declined in relative terms between 
1960 and 1980. Calculations by the US Department of  Labour show that unit labour costs 
increased in the seven largest countries of  the Community by an average of 8. 7 %per year, 
compared with 7.4% in Japan and 3.9% in the USA. 
Trends in the manufacturing gross rates of return confirm this relative decline in the overall 
productivity of all factors of production. 
1  COM (80) 726 final:  Small and medium-sized undertakings in the Community. 
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Lastly, European industry's loss of competitiveness has meant a loss of potential employ-
ment: over the last decade, the number of jobs in Europe increased by 2 million compared 
with 5 million in Japan and 19 million in the USA. 
It is very difficult to identify the causes of the EEC's poor industrial performance: in the 
first place, they are manifold, and secondly it is very easy to mistake effects for causes and 
thus make the wrong diagnosis. 
For this reason, the Commission, supported by Parliament's Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs, has started a detailed study of the competitiveness of European indus-
try: it will be available by the end of the year and will identify both the weaknesses and the 
strengths of industry in Europe. 
Even though this study has not yet been completed, the information available to the Com-
mission already shows that the Community can make a real contribution to industrial ex-
pansion and that this contribution cannot come from any other source. 
What will this contribution be? Can the EEC give industry the kind of fundamental im-
petus in the 1980s that it gave in the 1960s now that the economic context has turned into 
that of a world in crisis and the political and social climate has been marked by the basic 
choices of society which would be difficult to call into question? 
92 The answer is yes. A  Community strategy with this aspiration should drive for: 
(i)  renewed growth, by increasing productive investment, because without growth posi-
tive change will not be possible; 
(ii)  the establishment of a European industrial continuum, with specific incentives for the 
development of our industry. 
93 II.  Europe must take positive action 
When the common market was  set up  in  1958, European industry was  given  a  new 
framework in which to develop: it was given an objective-the customs union; a timetable-
10 years; and a strategy- international competitiveness. 
This Community framework, which was certainly a change in the established order and for 
industry might have been a leap in the dark, turned out to be the springboard for an unpre-
cedented industrial boom in the Community. 
But times have changed. In a world of increasingly fierce competition, change becomes at 
once more necessary yet more difficult and the authorities have to intervene more and 
more in order to bring it about. 
For instance, industry in the USA, which already enjoys the advantages of a continental-
scale market, can now count on large, particularly defence-related, public contracts. In 
Japan, the strategy of the main industrial groups is worked out within a planning frame-
work based on consensus between government and industry. 
In Europe, intervention on the market by the public authorities is just as substantial, if not 
more so. But its effectiveness is undermined by two factors: it is sporadic; and it carries the 
ever-present risk of  fragmenting the Community market.lt is all the more important to im-
prove the effectiveness of direct action by the public authorities to help industry in that 
there are so many historical, geographical and political constraints on industrial develop-
ment that elude control. 
Thus because Europe has not been able in time to make the qualitative changes which 
would have allowed it to act in concert, it is permanently on the defensive in the face of 
American and Japanese strategy. Europe is no longer calling the tune; Europe is no longer 
in the van. Its responses are empirical and ad hoc; and, because they are taken to be a reac-
tion rather than action, they lay themselves open to the charge of protectionism. 
The Community must waste no time in giving a fresh lead by proposing what positive action 
Europe should take. The response must be renewed growth, which alone will persuade 
business and workers to accept the need for change; and the arena will of necessity be 
Europe's internal market, which is  the greatest asset that Europe can give its industry. 
Pressing the European market into one important step further towards internal unity, 
thereby reaffirming its separate identity vis-a-vis  the outside world, will help to restore 
confidence. We must again see the common market as an opportunity for European indus-
try. That is  the thrust of the Commission's document on the internal market. 1 
1  COM (81) 313 final. Communication from the Commission to the Council on the state of the internal market. 
94 Again, confidence can be signalled by reviving productive investment, which is the only 
way of making a European industrial strategy credible: for it is in the first place the task of 
companies themselves to bring about the industrial reinvigoration of Europe. 
It  is therefore the companies themselves that must be reassured and convinced: the Com-
munity, as far as industrial policy is concerned, has no task more urgent or more important 
than this. 
95 III.  Reviving productive investment 
Our industrial base cannot be modernized without growth. 
But it must be decided which component of demand- exports or domestic demand, con-
sumption or investment-the Community is to take as a basis for growth that will nurture 
the renewal of our industrial base, both as regards new manufacturing techniques and the 
development of new products and services. 
In the past, growth in the EEC  was largely export-led: exports expanded at the same rate as 
world trade. Over the last few years, world trade has been slowing down and it is unlikely 
that we shall again see the like of the boom in the 1960s; but, and more to the point, Com-
munity industry as a whole is not in the best posture to take advantage of  an upturn in world 
demand, should one occur. 
96 
Graph  7: 
The EEC in  wortd  trade 
(1970  = 100) 
.. ..... . .... -··· ..  ... 
.  · .······  .. 
-------- Volume index of world exports (UN) 
Value index of extra-EC exports, deflated (SOEC) 
GOP volume index EUR 9 (SOEC) For since 1978 the share of the world market held by European products has been decreas-
ing and a gap is growing between the growth in world demand and the growth in Commun-
ity exports. 
In the face of this trend, which denotes a decline in Europe's competitiveness, the Com-
munity must take action to exploit all the possibilities provided by international trade, even 
if they are more limited than in the past: 
1.  The Community must re-emphasize that protectionism is a dead end for Europe: it is an 
absurd contradiction to predicate Europe's economic expansion on a growth in world 
trade and at the same time to hinder trade on its own market. 
2.  Conversely, the Community should insist that its industrial trading partners match its 
own contribution to the smooth functioning of the system according to GATT princi-
ples. This is a matter of the domestic macroeconomic policies of these countries and the 
opening-up of their markets. It could also mean taking measures in concert with our 
partners along the lines of the OECD agreement on steel, which guarantees solidarity 
between the Community and the other producer countries in restructuring the industry, 
or the Multifibre Arrangement for textiles. 
3.  Finally, the Community has special responsibilities vis-a-vis the developing countries 
whereby it stimulates their internal growth, which in turn should provide direct spin-
offs in the form of orders for capital goods. 
In fact, the Community will find the springs for the growth it is looking for both in the reor-
ganizing of competitiveness and in the expansion ofits own internal demand. The nature of 
this additional internal demand still has to be defined. 
As the twin aims are to create more jobs which can generate wealth and at the same time to 
combat inflation, productive investment must be both the engine for industrial revival and 
its secure basis, since it not only creates additional demand, but also helps to improve pro-
ductivity. The Commission recommends that priority be given to productive investment, 
first of all io.  industry but also in the major supporting infrastructures. 
A revival based on consumption, especially public sector consumption, would not offer the 
same advantages. 
It is therefore better to wait for consumption to rise as a result of the improvement in gen-
eral productivity, whether this leads to higher incomes or a drop in the real prices of con-
sumer goods. 
Stimulation by means of  investment will do more to help industrial redeployment if  enough 
of this investment is directed towards: 
(i)  new technologies which aim primarily to improve productivity; 
(ii)  activities which tie in with the priorities set by the Community, like energy andre-
search and development, or activities connected with environmental protection which 
also directly create jobs. 
Investment of the first type helps to improve and modernize the industrial employment 
base by increasing overall productivity in the economy. Its job creation impact occurs only 
with a time-lag as sales, particularly exports, increase following improvements in competi-
tiveness. Investment of the second type has a more immediate effect in creating new jobs. 
97 Investment must be directed to upgrading both the human and financial resources of com-
panies and the quality of the technologies to which they have access. 
The common feature of this type of  investment is that it generally has to be at the initiative 
of the public authorities; when necessary, they should be in a position to provide finance 
and, to do so, they should be able to recast fiscal policy so that the requisite resources are 
transferred from consumption to investment, in such a way as to avoid stimulating infla-
tion. 
A.  Energy 
The first essential for energy is investment to secure supply and conserve energy. 
It  is unrealistic to think we can create a climate favourable to productive investment if we 
do not make this vital effort to guarantee the independence and security of the economic 
environment. 
The Commission recently published its conclusions and proposals on this matter. 1  The 
Council's reply will be a credibility test of the determination of governments to work to-
wards the revival of the Community's industry. 
Between now and 1990, the Community should invest an amount of  between 500000 mill-
ion and 750000 million ECU to diversify its sources of energy and to save energy. 
B.  Research and development 
Owing to budgetary difficulties, almost all the Member States have cut down on govern-
ment funding for R & D at the very time when financial conditions in the business world 
have compelled many companies to restrict their own expenditure. In its analysis of R&D 
in the Community, the Commission found that, having regard to both the scale of research 
requirements and the resources available, efforts are too scattered, supply does not match 
demand and the effectiveness of what has been done is  very uneven.  2 
The priorities selected for Community research should be more relevant to both present 
and future industrial requirements, and companies should have readier access to the re-
search findings. 
The Commission advocates a greater emphasis on the long view:  long-term projections 
that are already feasible must be prepared, and essential industries like chemicals and 
motor vehicles, now in the throes of  major change, must have the technologies they need in 
good time so that they can continue to be a source of wealth and employment. 
1  COM(81)540, 1 October 1981. The development of an energy strategy for the Community. 
2
. COM (81) 57  4, Scientific and technical research and the European Community: proposals for the 1980s. 
98 At the same time, a greater effort must be deployed in the new technologies-biotechnol-
ogy, information technology, communications and automation. 
In these fields, the Commission proposes to launch a new industrial R&D programme for 
the long term: to develop European capacities for the production of microprocessors and 
opto-electronic equipment and for the transmission, management and processing of in-
formation. 
In view of the pressure of international competition through innovation, the Community 
must ensure that industrial R&D is underpinned and enhanced by exploiting the advan-
tages offered by the European dimension-advantages in economic scale (markets), indus-
trial application (innovation) and the breadth of legislative provisions (standards etc.). 
The Community must also take action to serve objectives of common interest, to fill 
dangerous gaps and where necessary to facilitate technological ventures which are an in-
dustrial gamble. 
The Community must also step in when national resources are on too small a scale to sup-
port technological programmes, and to make sure that smaller Member States are not left 
at a disadvantage and that regional imbalances are not created. 
C.  Innovation 
A sound technological base is  a necessary but not sufficient condition of industrial de-
velopment. The Commission recognizes this and has spelt out in detail all the factors which 
determine the behaviour of companies and society as regards innovation. 1 
Taxation and conditions for obtaining finance for high-risk investments must be less harsh. 
Business leaders must be given the chance to try out innovations which are not yet on the 
market, by means of pilot projects for example. The economic environment, both general 
and as codified in legislation, also has a major influence on the vast majority of companies, 
which, owing to their limited size, are little affected by specific measures. 
Regional measures must be stepped up to improve infrastructures, the availability of in-
formation and the support framework for companies in the structurally weaker regions. 
The recently proposed changes to the Community's regional policy fully accommodate this 
objective.  2 
New consultation machinery must also be introduced to facilitate a common approach in 
development strategies for certain key sectors of technology. 
By these means, in sectors where the European dimension offers greater scope for effective 
action, the Community will be able to promote cooperation among companies active in the 
key technologies and to support initiatives based on new technologies. 
1  SEC (81) 1451/3, Industrial innovation policy- Principles for a Community strategy. 
2  COM(81) 589, ERDF- Revision of the regulation. 
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tion technology industries as a forum for this industry. The Commission and the industry 
together discuss the responses that are needed to the strategies of the major competitors 
and the support which the Community could give to these companies in research, standar-
dization, new product and service development and so on. 
As the Commission proposes to do for microelectronics, the Community should also be 
able to give direct assistance through adequate financial aid, and indirect assistance by 
legislative measures, to foster cooperation among European producers to enable them to 
catch up and even take over the leadership again in the development of products and ser-
vices which have a strategic impact on the whole of European industry. 
D.  Training 
The Commission considers that training and management conditions as they affect com-
pany employees can have a major influence on their performance in terms of productivity, 
innovation, investment and so on. There is certainly much more to be done in this field, and 
a leaf could be taken from the book of our principal competitors. 
The Commission intends to expand its role in this area through the European Social Fund 
and its training and education policy. 1 It is obvious that ultimately industrial job security 
depends on training, and that the Community cannot allow the shortage in certain skills to 
be yet another bottleneck, on top of the many constraints already in existence. 
E.  External investment 
The  growing  trend  towards  the  internationalization  of investment  means  that non-
European companies are investing and creating jobs and added value in the Community. 
Similarly, European companies should be able to invest outside the Community for the fol-
lowing reasons: 
(a)  International investment leads to the subsequent expansion of the international mar-
kets - in components, services and capital goods. 
(b)  It is the best means for voluntary industrial cooperation, promoting the development 
of countries which may become major trading partners, such as China, ASEAN coun-
tries and OPEC countries. 
(c)  It is an important way of strengthening our relations with the developing countries. 
(d)  The taking-over of companies can open up access to the technologies required. 
1  COM (81) 578 final:  New information technologies and social change. 
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(a)  to secure Europe's supply of essential raw materials. This means a renewed emphasis 
on investments in the extractive industries so as to escape from dependence on com-
peting industrialized countries. It also means establishing contractual relations with 
the raw materials exporting countries which would include supply agreements; 
(b)  to overcome the obstacles to the penetration of Third World markets and to offset our 
price competitiveness handicap by a policy of transfer of technology and the estab-
lishment of industry, whether this takes the traditional form of direct private invest-
ment or association with State-financed industrial development measures. Here too a 
stable organization of relations between the Community and the countries concerned 
is  a condition for success; 
(c)  in the context of the adjustment of our industrial structures, to develop consultations 
and exchanges of information on the developing countries' industrialization policies 
and prospects,  in  order  to  exploit  the  opportunities  for  industrial  cooperation, 
specialization and subcontracting. 
F.  External support measures 
Compared with its principal competitors, European industry is undeniably handicapped on 
the international markets by the fact that financial support and other measures to assist 
firms are taken in a national framework without any concerted action at Community level. 
The Community as such has virtually no instrument at present for promoting either exports 
or external investments. Certain practices, for example as regards financing and individual 
insurance of exports, have sometimes turned out to be an obstacle to closer cooperation on 
the international market among European firms. 
The Commission considers that the Community cannot continue to hold aloof from export 
policy, which quite rightly appears in the Treaty {Article 113). 
An effort must therefore be made to identify the weaknesses of European industry caused 
by the dispersal of effort in export and external investment policy, with a view to a tighter 
coordination of national instruments within the Community framework and, where this 
can and ought to be done, to the introduction of Community measures. 
G.  Supporting investment 
The investments referred to so far are necessary for the modernization of European indus-
try: but they will not be sufficient to ensure a revival on a scale that will have enough impact 
on employment.  Accordingly,  the governments,  by means of strict discipline  in  their 
budgetary options, must release the resources needed to develop investment in the major 
infrastructures which create a large-scale demand for industrial products, such as steel, 
railway equipment and water engineering equipment, and which will draw the various parts 
of the Community closer together. 
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creating employment, also strengthen European industry's general ability to capture major 
international contracts. 
Implementation of the Community's industrial strategy requires the adoption by the 
Council of the Commission's specific proposals for energy and research. This is both a con-
dition for success and necessary if the strategy is  to be credible. 
It  is also essential to do away with the obstacles standing in the way of productive invest-
ment. But, as the aim is of course to expand European industry in a way that will create 
productive employment in the Community, we must be certain that it will indeed be Euro-
pean companies that will effectively and in the first place benefit from this set of measures. 
This means that the Community must create, through all its policies, a European industrial 
continuum with a built-in element of preference for European companies. 
102 IV.  Towards a European industrial continuum 
In the 1960s the reduction in national levels of  protection by the abolition of customs duties 
was offset for companies by a European preference in the form of the Common Customs 
Tariff. 
This European preference has now declined as the CCT duties have fallen. In any case, 
owing to the increasing relative importance of non-tariff barriers to trade maintained or in-
troduced by the Member States, market unity is  not all that it should be. 
As a result, companies that venture into the European market by setting up organizations 
on a European scale do not find the huge continental market that they expected where 
economies of scale would compensate for the drawbacks of moving out of the immediate 
sphere of their country or countries of origin. Furthermore, the company organized on a 
European scale is often treated with suspicion by governments reluctant to afford it the ben-
efit of their various industrial policy instruments: financing, R&D aid, public contracts, 
norms and standards, etc. Thus, for a company to organize itself on a European scale, 
which ought to be a considerable asset in the common market, in fact turns out to be a 
handicap. 
The Community must therefore, as part of its attempt to unify its internal market, be able 
to grant such companies concrete advantages in the European context. 
This can be done through three types of measures. 
A.  A  European industrial continuum 
1.  The internal market 
As already pointed out in the introduction, the internal market is the very basis for a Euro-
pean industrial continuum. The Commission's proposals to strengthen it1 must therefore 
be considered as of the first importance in the European industrial strategy. The most im-
portant of these proposals are: 
1  COM (81) 313 final: Communication from the Commission to the Council on the state of the internal market. 
COM(81) 572 final:  Strengthening of the internal market. 
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create barriers to intra-Community trade; this will help to prevent and deter national 
protectionist measures. 
(b)  Technical norms and standards fixed at national level can stop companies launching 
long production lines from the outset, and can prevent small and medium-sized firms 
from supplying nearby markets on the other side of frontiers. Rather than trying to 
harmonize them after they have been set, it would be much more efficient and logical, 
when new norms and standards are required, to set them for the whole of the Com-
munity at once. This would give Community industry a sounder foundation by provid-
ing a unified market and thereby giving Community producers preferential access to 
the Community market. 
So that products can be designed directly for the single market, the Commission, in a 
proposal for a Council decision,  1  asked the Member States to take all measures necess-
ary to ensure that departments responsible for establishing technical rules and stan-
dards institutes cooperate closely to prevent the creation of barriers to trade. Priority 
in the establishment of norms and standards gives European industry an advantage 
over its competitors. 
(c)  The promotion of norms and standards for a larger market and even the world market 
may turn out to be advantageous for European industry in sectors where it is in a rela-
tively strong position. 
(d)  It  is also necessary for company law and taxation systems in the European Community 
to encourage the creation of European industrial entities and facilitate their activity in 
the common market. 
The Commission's proposals in this area should be adopted immediately. 
2 
(e)  Non-discriminatory access for all European companies to research activity carried out 
jointly in Member States with government aid. 
(f)  The Commission will pursue its endeavours to ensure that Article 7 of  the EEC Treaty 
is respected, i.e. that no discrimination by Member States based on company national-
ity is allowed. 
2.  Competition rules 
(a)  Where application of national and Community competition rules is  concerned, as-
sessment of the dominant character or position of  a company on a market, whether na-
tional or Community, must take into account, where necessary, the fact that this mar-
ket exposes the company to actual or potential competition from imports both from 
1  COM(80)400 final: Proposal for a Council decision laying down a procedure for the provision of information 
in the field of technical standards and regulations. 
2  Proposals for directives on the common tax rules applying to mergers, divisions and transfers of assets between 
companies established in different Member States, COM  (69) 5 final of 15.1.1969. 
- Proposal for a directive on harmonization of  corporate taxation systems and of  withholding tax on dividends, 
COM(73)392 final of 23.7.1975. 
- Proposal on the European cooperation grouping, COM(78) 139 final of 5.4.1978. 
- Proposal for a Council Regulation on the statute for European companies, 13. 5.1975, Bull. EC Suppl. 4/75. 
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course, that the rules on free trade are correctly observed. 
(b)  State aids are exceptions to the free play of the market. The Commission authorizes 
them only in cases where they serve regional or sectoral development objectives cov-
ered by the Treaty. This means that they must help to make enterprises competitive 
enough to operate without aid within a foreseeable period. Consequently, aids to sec-
tors in difficulty must be accompanied by the effective restructuring of the firms in 
these sectors. Greater stress must be put on the contribution of aids to restructuring, 
which is a requirement covering the whole common market. The Commission favours 
the granting of aid for developing advanced technology sectors that will promote both 
innovation and research and development. 
B.  Preferences with regard to public procurement 
Public  procurement is  becoming  an increasingly  vital  element  of national industrial 
strategies. The sealing-off of the national public sector procurement policies is a threat to 
the unity of the market that will get worse unless the growth of the public sector in the 
Member States is  accompanied by the opening-up of public contracts. 
Opening-up of public contracts is by no means easy. Governments are reluctant to use their 
own taxpayers' money to make purchases abroad; and nationalized industries, particularly 
where they enjoy a preferential status as suppliers, are jealously concerned to hold on to 
their captive markets, an important factor in their profitability. 
Opening up public contracts in a climate of crisis is even more difficult, if only because of 
the relative size of the public deficits, which more than ever weigh upon the stimulation of 
industrial activity in the country. Moreover, it is a hazardous matter suddenly to expose 
protected companies to international competition. 
Until now the Community has therefore opted for very gradual progress in this area, de-
spite the salutary effect in the medium term of such liberalization. 
However, the disadvantages of restricted public procurement, especially in advanced tech-
nology sectors where the national market is in most cases too small, are becoming more and 
more obvious: the time has come to take a firm step towards opening up these contracts. 
This could in certain cases be done more easily if the exclusive powers of the public 
authorities and national agencies were to be handed over to a European body that would 
develop a supply policy, or if there were Community-level consultations between national 
authorities. 
There is one strategic area where there is scope for making such a quantum leap: telecom-
munications. For reasons of efficiency and cost in which technological constraints play an 
essential part, new products and services, particularly space communications and inte-
grated numerical networks, must be designed from the outset at least in a European per-
spective, and not even restricted to the geographical area of the Community. A European 
public agency for coordination and execution for these new products and services is thus 
both necessary and possible. 
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1.  Coherence of Community policies 
In pursuing its horizontal policies and in using its own financial instruments, the Commun-
ity must stimulate the development of European companies. 
The Community has a range of policies- competition, environment, R&D, standardiz-
ation, financial instruments, trade policy - each of which has a bearing on industrial de-
velopment. The Commission is aware that it must run the Community policies as a coher-
ent whole, to facilitate structural adjustment to the constraints and demands of interna-
tional competition, the energy crisis and technological change. For  the iron and steel indus-
try this is explicit in the special provisions of the ECSC Treaty. In other areas the Com-
mission must facilitate the realization of objectives defined at Community level by means 
of a consensus on objectives and methods between the national administrations and indus-
try. 
The position adopted by the Commission on the motor vehicle industry  1 is an example of 
this. The Commission on its own initiative presented an exhaustive analysis of the situation 
and set out to apply all the relevant policies on a concerted basis. 
The Community already has a range of instruments for financing investments. Their al-
ready appreciable contribution to bringing about the basic conditions for a more rapid ad-
justment of Community industry must be increased. For this, priority must continue to be 
given to loosening the energy constraint, and greater priority must be given to the financing 
of projects undertaken by small and medium-sized companies, including those in high 
technology areas. 
2.  The Community as a public service 
As a public service the Community must, whenever its own needs so require, take action to 
encourage European industry to develop new products and services, with the aims of: 
(i)  giving producers a European frame of reference; 
(ii)  helping to fix  European norms and standards. 
Three examples from the field of information technology show the value of such pilot 
schemes: 
(a)  Industrial data  banks 
With the help of the national telecommunications authorities, the Community has intro-
duced the Euronet system, which enables any user with access to a suitable terminal linked 
1  COM(81)317 final,  11 June 1981: The European automobile industry- Commission statement. 
106 to the telephone network to interrogate interconnected data banks. The tariff for the ser-
vice is based not on distance but on interrogation time, i.e. whether the user calls from 
Milan, Copenhagen or Belfast he pays the same price. 
Euronet could serve as the support for a new Community initiative to provide information 
to governments and companies on market trends and changes in Community industrial 
structures. 
Today an increasingly critical factor in the industrial strategy of governments and com-
panies, from large groupings down to small companies, is the rapid availability of statistics 
on industrial activity. At the moment, for example, the market shares held by the Com-
munity clothing industry are known only up to 1979: but these market shares are an essen-
tial item of information for the preparatory work for renewal of the Multifibre Arrange-
ment. 
For the benefit of all potential users, the Community ought to set up data banks and indus-
trial performance charts and facilitate access to them via Euronet or in other ways. In addi-
tion to the benefit to users, this action by the Community would open up numerous outlets 
to equipment manufacturers and to public and private producers of data banks. 
(b)  Caddia experiment 1 
Rapid availability of external trade statistics is an important requirement for sound indus-
trial decisions. At present, data are collected mainly by traditional methods at frontier 
posts and the central processing of  these data at national level takes from several months to 
several years, depending on the information required. The Caddia experiment, sponsored 
by the Commission in liaison with the customs administrations of the Member States, is 
aimed at changing this by developing an integrated Community system for computerizing 
the statistics on external trade in agricultural products. As a pilot experiment, Caddia will 
also have an effect on the technical performance of the manufacturers of the data-process-
ing equipment involved in the project. 
(c)  Ins is integrated numerical network2 
Together with the telecommunications authorities, the Community is working on an inte-
grated numerical network to link up the various offices of the Community institutions and 
the capitals of the Member States. In its final version this network, known as Insis, will be 
used for circulating administrative information by linking up computers, videophones for 
teleconferences, rapid-action telecopiers and, of course, telephones. It  will be a forerunner 
of the future European telecommunications network and at the same time its nucleus. It 
will give European industry the chance to develop new products and services that will en-
sure it a lead over its American and Japanese competitors, even on their own markets. 
1  COM(81)276, 26 May 1981: Coordination of the actions of Member States and the Commission related to 
studies and projects preparatory to a long-term programme for the use of telematics for Community informa-
tion systems concerned with imports/exports and the management and financial control of agricultural market 
organizations. 
2  COM(81) 275,21 May 1981: Coordination ofthe activities of the Member States and Community institutions 
with a view to setting up a Community interinstitutional information system (Insis). 
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Every scrutiny of the driving forces behind industrial investment reveals that the security 
and confidence of the entrepreneur is a decisive factor. It is  therefore important for the 
Community to be seen by economic operators as the guarantor of  coherence and continuity 
in the evolution of their political,  economic and social environment. Accordingly,  the 
Community must explain the principles of its actions as clearly and precisely as possible. It 
is by means of the medium-term economic policy programme that the Member States and 
the Community should give company heads the information they need on policy directions 
in general and on economic policy in particular. It is in this context that the Community 
must keep constantly under review the outlook for and the results of  industrial policy meas-
ures implemented by the Member States and by the EEC. The Economic Policy Commit-
tee, attended for the purpose by representatives of  the ministers for industry, could serve as 
a forum for discussion between the national governments and the Commission. 
At the same time the necessary consultations with industrialists and the trade unions 
should be organized, in appropriate form, on the problems of industrial policy. 
108 Conclusions 
By setting up the common market and the customs union in 1958, the Treaty of Rome of-
fered companies a new field of action where national frontiers were pushed back to the 
borders of  the Europe of the Six. The free movement of persons and goods was intended to 
bring about an ever-increasing integration process. 
This process has, however, gradually been slowed down by fragmentation of the internal 
market due to growing public intervention in the national economies, which, if it results in 
markets being closed off against each other again, could be dangerous for the Community. 
This trend, which has discouraged the creation of European companies and groupings, has 
weakened our industry's ability to meet the challenges posed by the present crisis. In order 
to retain the benefit of limited national protection, companies in an increasing number of 
sectors have been deprived of the advantage of access to a large market. 
This trend, with all its implications for the employment situation, must be halted. 
The alternative proposal put forward by the Commission offers every chance of breathing 
new life into European industry if governments, companies and trade unions can again find 
the courage to operate throughout the Continental market. 
The first requirement is  a concerted effort, in a Community framework, so as  to ensure 
coherence, to revive productive investment by pursuing European energy, research and 
innovation policies and by developing financial instruments to further them. The aim here 
would be to win back the confidence of investors by launching this revival by means of a 
positive and active industrial policy. 
What is especially important, however, is to press the internal market into a further impor-
tant step on the road to integration by making it a genuine European industrial continuum, 
but with an element of Community preference in cases where industrial development in-
volves the participation of the public autorities, as in the field of technical standards and 
public procurement. 
The Commission expects the national governments to engage in a thoroughgoing discus-
sion of these proposals. It is ready to fuel this discussion by providing further information 
and specific suggestions for action, provided that the Council for its part prepares itself that 
it can take, when necessary, the urgent decisions that European industry demands. 
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